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Purpose of the study 
 
The aim of this study is to introduce North American major sports league salary cap systems. 
I summarize the development and the history of job market regulation in professional team 
sports. Different types of salary caps and leagues are presented to create a comprehensive 
understanding about the topic. The theoretical implications of a salary cap are presented 
based on previous literature. Previous studies suggest that a salary cap has two main 
motivations: to balance the competition and to lower player costs. In the empirical part of the 
thesis I keep my focus in the National Hockey League (NHL). I test whether the consequences 
implied by theory are consistent with the results in the NHL after the introduction of the first 
league-wide salary cap in 2005. My aim is to find out if the competition has balanced during 
the regular season and during the playoffs. Additionally, I examine consequences of lower 
player costs to the team owners and to the players. 
 
Data and methods 
 
Data on player salaries is collected from the USAToday website which has gathered NHL 
player salaries since the 2000-2001 season. Yearly player salary data consists of 700 to 748 
observations and in total the data set includes 9372 observations. Data on teams’ success is 
collected from different statistical websites which are listed in the thesis. I use statistical 
analysis methods such as Gini coefficient and Herfindahl-Hirchman Index to examine and 
illustrate the differences before and after the salary cap. 
 
Results 
 
The results of this study mainly support those suggested by the theory. Regular season 
competition became more balanced after the 2005 salary cap. However, competitive balance 
in playoffs did not grow, contradicting the theoretical suggestion. League-wide player costs 
decreased after the salary cap but the growth in salaries rapidly revoked the decrease. Income 
inequality did decrease. The most expensive players experienced the greatest cut in salaries 
and the lowest paid players experienced an increase in salaries. Differences in positional 
average salaries decreased and the valuation of players on their position standardized.  
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1. Introduction 
Professional sports player markets in North America have been regulated since the late 19th 
century and the earliest job market problems were found in the baseball labor market (Kahn 
2000). Job market regulation has become more common in professional sports and academic 
research has increased especially during the past fifty years. More complex regulation methods 
and salary cap systems have been introduced as professional sports grow in their economic 
importance. The National Hockey League season 2004-2005 was cancelled due to labor dispute 
between the league and the players’ association. The labor dispute was followed by the first 
salary cap in the NHL’s history. Salary caps have two main motivations; firstly, to balance 
competition and secondly, to limit the overall costs of teams (Dietl, Franck, Lang & Rathke 
2012). 
In this master’s thesis, I focus on salary caps in professional team sports. I introduce related 
literature and build comprehensive understanding about the theoretical results of setting a 
salary cap. In the empirical part, I examine if these results are found in the National Hockey 
League after the setting of the 2005 salary cap.  
In his study the Baseball Players’ Labor Market, Rottenberg (1956) discusses a number of 
market problems in the baseball labor market. He suggests that monopsony power is frank in 
the baseball labor market and competitors must be approximately equal size if any are to be 
successful. Rottenberg divides the market of baseball players into three markets: the market for 
free agents where the player is the seller, the market for signed players where teams are sellers 
and buyers, and the market for the current services of contracted players where the player is 
the seller and the team that holds his contract is the buyer. He argues that this so called “reserve 
rule” did not equalize the distribution of playing talent as it was supposed to and teams with 
higher bids were able to draw better players. 
Supporting Rottenberg, Neal (1964) states in his study the Peculiar Economics of Professional 
Sports that competitive balance is needed in professional sports and pure monopolism would 
be destructive. Neal suggests that the more frequently the standings chance, the larger will be 
the gate receipts. He concludes that in professional sports the league must be understood as the 
firm that acts as a natural monopolist. Within that league teams or athletes are the legally 
separate business firms that produce several joint products.  
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Staudohar (1998) focuses on the effects of salary caps in professional team sports. He presents 
labor market problems, such as salary caps, in four major leagues in the U.S.. In 1998 a salary 
cap was placed in two of the four leagues which are basketball and football leagues. Staudohar 
concludes that salary caps and payroll taxes may seem beneficial to owners but their effect is 
more symbolic and cosmetic than fundamental. 
In his study, the Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports, Késenne (2000) 
concentrates on competitive balance, the level and the distribution of player salaries, owner 
profits and total league revenue. In Chapter 3.1, I show Késenne’s idea in more detail as I 
consider it comparable to the salary cap in the NHL with some adjustments. Contradicting 
Staudohar (1998) Késenne argues that a salary cap improves the competitive balance and the 
player salary distribution, holds down the excessive top player salaries, and guarantees the club 
owners a reasonable profit rate. 
Kaijalainen (2013) examined in her master’s thesis how the first salary cap in the NHL altered 
wage determination and salary distribution. Her findings show that only the importance of 
experience increased remarkably when determining the player’s salary. Also, her findings 
suggest that the demand of the most valuable players has decreased and the demand for upper 
middle class (based on talent) has increased. 
The first aim of this research is to describe the theoretical implications of setting a salary cap 
on competition and teams’ player costs. Secondly, in the empirical part of the thesis I test 
whether the implications of a salary cap suggested by the theory hold in the NHL. To do this, 
I use player and team salaries which are available on the USAToday website and team success 
information collected from different statistical websites. I examine the league-wide changes 
and my research questions are: 
1. What are the consequences on competitive balance and teams’ player costs implied by 
theory after the implementation of a salary cap?  
2. Did the 2005 NHL salary cap balance competition? 
3. Has the 2005 NHL salary cap limited the overall player costs of the teams?  
3.1 What are the results of limited player costs to the team owners and to the 
players? 
A salary cap is expected to lower the player costs of a big market team and increase the player 
costs of small market team. Based on the leveling effect of a salary cap the talent distribution 
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should become more equal. Consequently, a salary cap should lead to a more competitively 
balanced league.  
Empirical findings in this study suggest that the 2005 salary cap made regular season 
competition more balanced. This result is based on the more equal distribution of wins, points 
and standings after the regular season. On the other hand, playoff competition after the salary 
cap did not become more balanced. Playoff rounds are distributed less evenly and the 
distribution of wins during playoffs has not changed.  
The 2005 NHL salary cap did limit the overall player costs of the NHL teams.  Small market 
teams increased their spending and large market teams decreased their spending. Also, 
accumulated player costs decreased. The franchise values of the NHL teams started to increase. 
Players experienced a cut in average salaries and highest paid players felt the greatest cut. 
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter one focuses on creating an extensive background 
information and motivation for the thesis. Chapter two introduces the history of salary caps in 
North America. Chapter three illustrates the theoretical effects of different kind of salary caps. 
Chapter four shows that there are differences between leagues and their objectives. In chapter 
five, I present the salary caps at the moment in U.S major leagues. Chapter six collects 
important information about the National Hockey League. In chapter seven, I introduce the 
data set and provide empirical research questions and research methods. In chapter eight, I 
analyze the research questions in detail one by one. In chapter nine, I make conclusions and 
suggest some possible areas for further and future research. 
 
1.1 Definitions 
When talking about salary caps there are some additional factors that need to be taken into 
account to fully understand the importance and relevance of salary caps. In this chapter, I 
introduce relevant concepts and define them briefly. Definitions will give a better 
understanding when reading the thesis as these concepts are highly linked to each other and 
need to be defined.  
 
Introduction to salary cap 
Salary caps in professional sports have two main motivations: firstly, to balance competition 
in professional team sports where economic powers between teams notably differ and secondly, 
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to limit the overall costs of teams (Dietl, Franck, Lang & Rathke 2012).  The following 
definition for a salary cap is provided by www.businessdictionary.com:  “the limit placed on a 
salary paid out to employees and enforced by the government or another organization”. In the 
case of professional sports, league management and player associations negotiate a salary cap 
that satisfies both parties. Most salary caps have upper and lower limits that define the range 
of a total team spending on player salaries. In professional sports, players are seen as employees 
and salary caps limit salaries paid for them. Késenne (2000) states that in order to guarantee a 
more or less balanced competition, sport federations and league authorities have always tried 
to regulate the player labor market and to prevent the concentration of all playing talent in the 
rich big-city clubs that can offer better salaries than the small-town clubs.  
As noted in Késenne’s statement, the market size of clubs is one main character when 
determining the economic power of the team. Teams located in metropolitan areas with for 
example more than 10 million citizens have a cutting edge when compared with small-town 
clubs with for example half a million citizens. Therefore, most talented players would be 
compensated more open handedly for their services in big-city teams. Salary caps are to 
diminish this phenomenon. Also, salary caps reduce self-destructing behavior like overpaying 
talented players when a team does not have economic stability and power to do this (Késenne 
2000). Without salary caps, small-town clubs would have a higher need to pay greater salaries 
for their star players as salary caps would not limit the purchasing power of big-city teams. 
Consequently, big-city teams are not able to gather all the star players of leagues as a salary 
cap start to limit spending when the agreed spending limit is reached. Thus, smaller clubs have 
a possibility to attract more talented players with their offers. 
 
North American major leagues 
North America has four major leagues. These leagues are Major League Baseball (MLB), the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL) and the National 
Hockey League (NHL). Most of the academic studies on professional team sports in North 
America focus on these four or on one of them. I introduce salary cap systems in all four leagues 
keeping my main focus on the NHL. 
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Playoffs and the Stanley Cup 
The NHL includes thirty teams that compete for the Stanley Cup which is the championship 
trophy awarded annually. During the regular season, all thirty NHL teams compete for playoff 
entry which is achieved by the sixteen most successful teams. These sixteen teams form a cup 
stage called the playoffs where teams play against each other in pairs. In every pair, team that 
first has four wins is the one to proceed to the next round. Two final teams left in the playoffs 
play in the Stanley Cup finals. The winner is declared the Stanley Cup winner. 
 
The rookie draft system 
All four major sports leagues in North America have experienced the effects of salary caps and 
rookie draft system. In a rookie draft event teams have a first possibility to sign young players 
that have come to a certain age. Teams draft players in reversed order of last season success; 
team that finished last in previous season will start the draft event of starting season. A rookie 
draft has a two-edged effect as noted by Rosenthal (1995): “The major positive aspect of the 
draft … is that the draft provides a way to distribute talent to teams and its goal is to do so both 
fairly and in such a way so as to maintain a competitive balance. On the other hand, the draft 
distorts the free market and eliminates the choice of amateurs to decide where they want to 
play and with whom to negotiate.” This is a common situation in professional sports where the 
demand and supply of labor are in many ways not comparable to regular job markets. Salary 
caps and draft system both lower the power of players for negotiating as longer contracts are 
introduced and it is possible for a team to own a players’ job supply for several years.  
 
Free agency 
Four major sports in North America all have a free agency system. Free agency system allows 
players to sell their services to other clubs after a certain period of time has elapsed (Staudohar 
1998). In other words, players under contract are not allowed to make a new deal with other 
teams when they have a valid contract with one team. Team that owns the contract of a player 
can sell the contract of that player to another team meaning that a player can be sold without 
letting him know beforehand. When a player has been sold to another team, his or her contract 
is still valid and that player has an obligation to fulfill the original contract even though the 
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team (the owner of the player) has changed. Free agency is the only situation when players are 
not obligated to one team and have a power to negotiate their own contract.  
Monopsony power in professional sports labor markets 
The rookie draft system, lack of free agency regulations and limited amount of teams lead to a 
monopsony power of teams and leagues in player labor markets in professional sports. Boal 
and Ransom (1997) state that “numerous models of buyer market power have been developed 
that do not assume a single buyer or even a small number of buyers. Today the term "labor 
monopsony" is applied more broadly to any model where individual firms face upward-sloping 
labor supply.” In professional sports, players have multiple teams to negotiate with but league 
regulations limit players’ possibilities to negotiate with these teams. Boal and Ransom (1997) 
also argue that professional sports leagues in North America are organized with distinctive 
monopsonistic characteristics, such as the rookie draft, and agreements between teams that 
restrict the mobility of players within the league. According to these findings, professional 
sports leagues arguably have notable monopsonistic power. Teams might compete for talent 
but once a player is signed for one team league regulations lower the player’s negotiation 
power. 
Agency considerations help explain why salaries were related to performance, but surely wages 
would be higher in a contract system where players owned their contract rights and could 
negotiate freely with all teams in the league (Rosen & Sanderson 2001). More common labor 
contracts are known to have a few weeks term of notice and ability to negotiate with every 
company in the industry. Professional sports players have considerably low bargaining power 
as their multiple year contracts are owned by teams and can be sold without negotiations with 
the player. 
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2. The historical overview and development of salary caps in North 
America 
In this Chapter, I present a summation to the history and development of salary caps in North 
America. Most of the existing literature is concentrated on salary caps and free agency in North 
American baseball leagues. Thus, I keep my main focus on baseball. Concentrated on the end 
of this chapter, I shortly introduce other major leagues. More analysis will take place in Chapter 
5 where the most recent salary cap systems are introduced. 
 
The 19th century – first salary cap introduced in the National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs 
Baseball is the oldest major league sport in the U.S., beginning with the birth of the National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs (NL) in 1876. During this period, there was competition 
for player services from other baseball leagues. To protect itself against the competition of rival 
leagues and improve the team owners' balance sheets, the NL introduced the "reserve clause" 
in 1879, which meant that players were bound to the team that originally acquired the rights to 
contract with them. Consequently, owners now had additional monopsony power over players, 
and player salaries dropped. (Kahn 2000.) 
This is a violation of free agency introduced in the previous chapter and thus gives more power 
to a team that has signed a player. Under reserve clause player contracts are owned by teams 
and consequently teams have higher ground when negotiating new contracts with players 
already signed to the team.  
First known salary cap in North America was introduced in baseball. This was not a limit on 
total spending but a maximum salary that can be paid to one player. A $2500 salary cap per 
player was introduced in 1885 and this caused notable dissatisfaction among the players. After 
profitable 1889 season players struck back and established a separate league, called a Players’ 
League, which had no reserve clause or salary caps but this league failed to overcome 
disadvantages of starting from scratch, and players put too much trust in the capitalists, who 
had their own agendas. (Riess 2012.) 
After the failure of Players’ League there were still two competing baseball leagues left: the 
NL and the American Association (AA). Kahn (2000) found in his study that in 1891, four of 
the AA teams were absorbed into the NL, and five dissolved American Association franchises 
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were bought out by the survivors.  Kahn (2000) also states that this merger led to a NL owners' 
announcement in 1893 of a new salary policy: the maximum pay for a player was to be $2,400. 
This salary cap in North America was possible as the two competing leagues merged. As a 
result, salaries within one league were easier to agree on because of the lack of competition. 
Competition between the two leagues before the merger led to higher player salaries. Arguably, 
players benefitted more from competition than teams did as salaries paid for the players were 
greater before the introduction of salary caps. After the merger monopsony power of the league 
increased again as competition only existed within the league. 
 
The 20th century – the development of salary caps and introduction of free agency 
When coming to the 20th century, the NL again faced competition from another league. 
Beleaguered NL monopoly, which had survived challenges from rival leagues in the late 19th 
century for over two decades, was being faced with the formation of yet another rival in the 
American League of 1900 (Vrooman 2000).  
“The huge success of the American League brought with it a dramatic rise in player salaries. 
In fact the salary increase appears to begin in 1900, perhaps reflecting anticipation of the new 
league. The two leagues merged during the 1903 season, at the end of which the first World 
Series was played. Then in 1903, salaries in Major League Baseball fell immediately by about 
15 percent.” (Kahn 2000.) 
The early stages of American baseball seem to have familiar pattern as the NL faces 
competition and after tend to merge with its competitors. Competition increases player salaries 
as the monopsony power of the NL decreases. The NL tries to prevent the success of competing 
leagues by reserve clause regulations and deals negotiated with players under monopsony 
power it has. Competing league faces operational problems as it lacks experience and structures 
like stadiums to maintain competition with the NL. Problems faced make it more tempting for 
the capitalist managers of a competing league to merge with the NL. Consequently, the NL 
ends up with monopsony power once again and players’ salaries decrease making players less 
satisfied. 
Until 1976, players in each of the four major North American sports were bound by the reserve 
clause to remain with their original team, unless that team decided to trade or sell them to 
another team. The reserve clause maintained the monopsony power of leagues and resulted in 
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frustrated players. Players’ union thrived for free agency in baseball and succeeded in 1976. 
This had a powerful impact on the salaries of baseball players: the average real increase in 
baseball salaries was from 0-2 percent per year from 1973-75 and in 1976 it was almost 10 
percent. (Kahn 2000.) 
The National Basketball Association (NBA) does not have as long history related to salary 
disputes as baseball has. Like the other four major sports, basketball went through its “dark 
ages” for player salaries during the years of owner application of the reserve clause (Staudohar 
1998). Basketball players also won free agency in 1976 but via different route than baseball 
players (Kahn 2000). This increased salaries in NBA which eventually resulted in the 
introduction of a salary cap. 
In the National Football League (NFL) free agency was not introduced in 1976. From 1977 to 
1987 voluntary movement of players was virtually nonexistent because of the compensation 
required for teams that signed free agents (Staudohar 1998). Free agency existed but had clear 
limitations as required compensations blocked nearly all possible player sales and trades. 
National Hockey League (NHL) had never had a work stoppage until 1992 and enjoyed many 
years of relatively placid negotiations (Staudohar 1998). This can partly be explained by the 
comparably short history of the NHL when compared with North American baseball leagues. 
Since the 1990s NHL has suffered strikes and lock-outs due to salary cap negotiations (see 
Chapter 6). 
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3. Different types of salary caps 
In this chapter, I introduce and discuss different types of salary caps. Salary caps are roughly 
divided in hard and soft salary caps. Also, there are voluntary salary caps and different methods 
how to calculate salary caps. This chapter introduces hard, soft and voluntary salary caps, and 
how a percentage of revenue salary cap is calculated. 
 
3.1 Hard salary cap 
In the case of a hard salary cap team has a strict limit on how much it can spend on player 
salaries per season. In this chapter, I use two club model presented by Késenne (2000) as a 
framework when showing the theoretical effects of introducing a hard salary cap that only has 
a fixed upper limit that a team can spend and no lower limit. Firstly, Késenne (2000) assumes 
that a team can only have a fixed number of players (L) on the field so a club faces the 
restriction that:  
𝐿1 + 𝐿2 = 𝐿     (3.1) 
Where 𝐿1 stands for top players and 𝐿2 for regular players.  
On the cost side Késenne (2000) assumes that a club’s total cost only consists of player salaries. 
𝐶1 is the labor cost of a top player and 𝐶2 is the labor cost of a regular player. The cost function 
can now be written, given the constraint above, as: 
𝐶 = (𝐶1 − 𝐶2)𝐿1 + 𝐶2𝐿    (3.2) 
Third assumption we need to adopt form Késenne (2000) is that a salary cap is not effective 
for the small club, so that the demand conditions for top players are unchanged. Also, the big 
club has to maximize its profits under the constraint of the salary cap. When introducing a hard 
salary cap (CAP) the equation (3.2) can be written as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃 = (𝐶1 − 𝐶2)𝐿1 + 𝐶2𝐿   (3.3) 
→ 𝐶1 − 𝐶2 = (𝐶𝐴𝑃 − 𝐶2𝐿)/𝐿1  
The following figure draws two club model labor market equilibrium with one big team (X) 
and one small team (Y): 
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Figure 1: Salary caps and market equilibrium (Késenne 2000) 
 
Without salary cap (CAP) labor market equilibrium is found from the intersection of marginal 
revenue curves (𝑀𝑅𝑥 and 𝑀𝑅𝑦) of the two teams at point A. Horizontal axis illustrates that 
there is a competition between the two teams for fixed amount of 𝐿1 (𝐿𝑆 =  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦). At 
point A, big team has most of top players as 𝐿1
𝐴 is located on the right side of 50/50 point of 
the given supply of 𝐿1 on the horizontal axis. Salary distribution between 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 is presented 
on the vertical axis.  
When a salary cap is introduced it effects the market equilibrium. As we can see from the figure 
marginal revenue curve for team X (𝑀𝑅𝑥) is above the CAP and thus salary cap limits spending 
on salaries. New labor market equilibrium is found at point B which is at the intersection of 
CAP for team X and marginal revenue curve for team Y. 𝐶1
𝐵 − 𝐶2 < 𝐶1
𝐴 − 𝐶2 illustrates that 
movement from equilibrium A to equilibrium B has made salary distribution between 𝐿1and 
𝐿2 more even. Also, on the horizontal axis point 𝐿1
𝐵 is closer to 50/50 point of given supply of 
top players than point 𝐿1
𝐴 and thus the distribution is more even. 
Arguably this theory presents how salary cap can have a balancing effect on labor market 
equilibrium. It is important to show how salary cap affects owner surplus. Figure 2 illustrates 
how owner surpluses are affected by a salary cap. 
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Figure 2: Salary caps and owner profits (Késenne 2000) 
 
For the small club Y the model clearly shows a rise in profits as indicated by the shaded area 
on the right side of Figure 2. For the big club X which no longer can reach its profit maximizing 
position, the situation after the salary cap is only slightly more complicated. On the one hand 
there is an increase in profits as big as the shaded rectangular area on the left side of Figure 2, 
but there is a loss of profits indicated by the shaded triangular are in the middle. Comparing 
the size of both area’s it is clear that also the big club’s profits go up due to the salary cap. 
(Késenne 2000.) 
In a two club model teams have greater surpluses and player salaries decrease and thus profit 
maximizing teams should encourage salary caps. Also, when salary cap is restrictive only for 
the big club it makes the league more equal which should increase its attractiveness. Fort and 
Quirk (1995) point out a different possible result of a salary cap in a multiple team league. 
The league could begin to lose its TV audiences in strong-drawing cities as these traditionally 
powerful teams become just one of the bunch. Further, the reduction in strength of powerful 
teams could open the gate of rival leagues featuring strong teams in these centers of interest. It 
is not simply a matter of theoretical interest that league-wide revenues are not maximized under 
a cap (because marginal revenue products of teams are not equalized), it is a matter of real-
world interest to leagues and players as well. (Fort and Quirk 1995.) 
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The owners of the bigger rich clubs are not, or cannot be, fully aware of the fact that the lack 
of uncertainty of outcome diminishes the public interest in the league championship, keeping 
people and television away from the ball park. Because of this overestimation of the marginal 
revenue of playing talent, the Pareto optimum can only be reached by restricting their demand 
for playing talent. The size of this externality, which can be derived from empirical studies of 
the impact of the uncertainty of outcome, should be taken into account when determining the 
level of the cap. (Késenne 2000.) 
Both papers cited in this chapter make valid arguments on behalf of introduction of salary cap. 
Rich teams’ purchasing power needs to be limited in order to avoid too uneven league. On the 
other hand, if purchasing power is too limited all teams become equal and rich team fans who 
are used to success might lose interest in following their team. Also, rival leagues might come 
up with bigger budgets and better success which might make them more interesting for 
audience. 
 
Individual and team salary cap 
Individual salary cap presented as a horizontal CAP line in Figure 3 needs to be set below 
market equilibrium to be effective. New market equilibrium will be found somewhere between 
point F and intersection of team salary cap for team X and individual salary cap. Késenne 
(2000) argues that market equilibrium will be found close to the intersection point of CAP for 
team X and individual salary cap as rich teams can offer the star players more non-wage or 
fringe benefits on top of their salary. 
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Figure 3: The individual salary cap (Késenne 2000) 
 
The result of this individual cap is that the competitive balance becomes less equal than under 
a payroll cap, which is probably not what league wishes. The only positive outcome is that the 
individual cap further improves the salary distribution between stars and regulars. Késenne 
2000 
 
3.2 Soft salary cap 
Soft salary cap means that teams have a salary cap but there are also exceptions that allow for 
exceeding the salary cap. In the National Basketball League (NBA), salary cap was and remains 
a soft cap and thus it can be used as an example when introducing a soft salary cap.  According 
to Staudohar (1998) first exception made under salary cap in the NBA in 1983 was that teams 
were allowed to retain at any price one player who became a free agent, and that player’s salary 
would not count against the cap. Under this exception teams are able to negotiate deals that are 
not counted against the cap as signed player may become a free agent after one year deal. Thus, 
the same team can pay notably higher wages for signed player after that one year has passed as 
it does not count against the cap anymore. For example, player might sign up a multiple season 
contract of half a million dollars per season. If the contract allows the player to become a free 
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agent after one season the team and the player can re-negotiate the deal with a higher salary 
and it does not count against the salary cap as the player is a free agent. 
When a team has reached its salary cap it would not be able to sign rookies. Staudohar (1998) 
mentions that “another feature of the 1983 agreement was that teams that were at or over the 
salary cap could sign rookies to 1-year contracts for only $75,000 for first-round draft choices, 
and $65,000 for lower picks.“ This exception gives an opportunity for teams that have spent 
their whole cap to sign rookies with a lower price. Those players who are drafted to teams that 
have reached their cap level are signed for a lower salary than they most likely would have 
been able to negotiate if the cap has not been reached.  
Salary cap exceptions are complex and they vary continuously as player associations negotiate 
with leagues. Most often these exceptions provide a possibility for a team to exceed the salary 
cap and in the soft salary cap examples presented the player is most likely to experience 
disadvantages. 
 
3.3 Percentage of revenue salary cap 
Percentage of revenue is a way to determine the level of a salary cap. The cap is calculated as 
a percentage of defined gross revenue of the league, based on the total revenue of all clubs 
together, during the previous season, divided by the number of clubs in the league (Késenne 
2003). In NBA, percentage of revenue cap is in use and according to Staudohar (1998) this 
percentage was set at 53% in 1983 and has varied conformable to new agreements between 
NBA and National Basketball Players Association. Zimbalist (2010) argues that in the presence 
of unequal club revenues, if all teams are compelled to have payrolls within a certain narrow 
range, and such range is determined based on league-wide revenues, then markedly unequal 
rates of profit across the clubs may result. Thus, in the case of percentage of revenue cap the 
league should have as equal club revenues as possible in order to guarantee equal profits across 
the clubs. 
 
3.4 Voluntary salary cap 
Salary caps in U.S are strictly controlled by the league and agreements are expected to be 
obeyed. In European football league’s strict salary caps has not been set and the situation is 
totally different. In European football league’s biggest teams have formed voluntary contracts 
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to limit spending. Voluntary salary cap is not enforced by the league and obeying the rules is 
voluntary.  
In the race for hiring and keeping the best players, the share of some clubs' payroll has risen to 
unsustainable percentages of their total budgets. Consequently, a salary cap, as it is proposed 
by the G-14, the association of the 18 most successful clubs in European football, is 
fundamentally different from the salary cap as it has been introduced in some major leagues in 
the U.S. (Késenne 2003.) 
In European football leagues the best teams from a lower league are promoted to the next higher 
league, while the weakest teams in the latter are demoted to the former. The composition of an 
open league changes annually through promotion and relegation. Promotion and relegation 
decrease the probability of future interaction resulting in a stronger devaluation of future 
profits. Self-enforcing salary caps are ceteris paribus less likely in open leagues than in 
hermetic leagues. (Dietl, Franck & Nüesch 2006.) 
Teams in an open league do not have an incentive to comply the voluntary salary cap if it results 
in a negative consequences for the team. For example a team that would otherwise relegate 
from the league can increase its profits when it spends more than voluntarily agreed. The team 
is able to retain its league position which will most likely result in higher incomes next season 
than in the case of relegation. Also, when other teams in the league are possibly promoted or 
relegated voluntary agreements are less beneficial as probability of playing against the same 
teams is lower than in a hermetic league. 
Dietl et al. (2006) argue that based on their model with two identical profit-maximizing teams 
the self-enforcing character of salary caps increase with the clubs’ discount factor and the 
importance of competitive balance. Additionally they state that that voluntary salary caps have 
to be self-enforcing in order to be effective in limiting player expenses. In European leagues 
where teams play national and international cups on the side of their national league 
competitive balance is not likely to be as important as in U.S and thus voluntary salary caps 
are not self-enforcing and will not effectively limit player expenses.  
In a win-maximizing league a salary cap proposed by G-14 in European football, for reasons 
of financial prudence, can be expected to have negative impact on the distribution of talent 
among teams and on the competitive balance in a league as cost structures of the small and 
large market teams differ notably (Késenne 2003).  
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4. Different types of leagues and teams 
 
4.1 Profit maximization in North American leagues 
Debate on the profit maximization of professional sports leagues has not reached consensus. In 
this chapter, I present the profit maximizing behavior and my analysis follows the theory and 
the model presented by Ferguson, Stewart, Jones and Le Dressay (1991) in their article “The 
pricing of sports events: do teams maximize profits?”  
Although sports fans may resist profit maximizing prices and teams may deny that they are 
motivated by profit maximization, it is not clear what this means for their actual behavior. 
When considering profit maximization in the case of professional sports, there are two main 
questions to be considered: 
1. Will sports fans not attend a game of a favored (winning) team for profit maximization 
alone? 
2. Will teams forego opportunities for more revenue? 
The NHL is chosen as an example to test the pricing motivation for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
close to unregulated local monopoly for which data on prices, sales, product attributes and 
market characteristics are available for individual (teams). Secondly, there is an ongoing debate 
over the appropriateness of the profit maximization assumption on professional sports 
industries. (Ferguson et al. 1991.) 
 
Assumptions, the model and the data 
The approach chosen by Ferguson et al. (1991) require three assumptions:  
1. Costs which vary with attendance are small so that profit maximization coincides with 
revenue maximization. 
2. Games are sufficiently homogeneous that the depiction in terms of a representative 
game does not do undue violence to a team's actual calculations. 
3. A single price is sufficient to describe a team's choice alternatives. 
For the more extensive description of the assumptions see Ferguson et al. (1991). 
Given the assumptions above it is possible to write down the inverse demand function which 
illustrates the demand for attendance at the representative game of a team 
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𝑝 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑧; Ɵ)    (4.1) 
where 𝑝 is the team’s average ticket price, 𝐴 is average attendance per home game within the 
season, 𝑧 is a vector of attributes of the team and its home city and Ɵ is a vector of parameters. 
The team’s ticket revenue is  
𝑅(𝐴, 𝑧; Ɵ) = 𝐴𝑓(𝐴, 𝑧; Ɵ)    (4.2) 
average attendance times the team’s average ticket price. According to profit maximization 
hypothesis, the team is expected to choose a level of attendance A and corresponding price so 
as to 
max
𝐴
𝑅(𝐴, 𝑧; Ɵ) s.t. 𝐴 ≤ 𝐶   (4.3) 
where C is the arena capacity. This maximizes team’s profits and naturally average attendance 
cannot be greater than arena capacity. Team’s behavior is characterized by Kuhn-Tucker 
condition  
𝑑𝑅(𝐴,𝑧;Ɵ)
𝑑𝐴
≥ 0,  
𝑑𝑅(𝐴,𝑧,Ɵ)
𝑑𝐴
(𝐶 − 𝐴) = 0, 𝐶 − 𝐴 ≥ 0  (4.4) 
To represent the team’s choices the equation 
𝑑𝑅(𝐴, 𝑧; Ɵ)
𝑑𝐴
(𝐶 − 𝐴) = 0 
where marginal revenue times unused capacity equals zero is chosen. 
Ferguson et al. (1991) use NHL data from 1981, 1982, and 1983 seasons to test either teams 
are profit maximizers or not. Then the league included 21 teams and the data set contains 63 
observations describing team behavior.  
 
The results 
In their study Ferguson et al. (1991) conclude that even in the context of this simple model they 
fail to reject the hypothesis of profit maximization: econometric results offer considerable 
support for the profit maximizing behavior.  
The study suggests that for sellout teams (𝐶 = 𝐴) marginal revenue should be nonnegative and 
this is violated in only a single instance, whereas negative values for marginal revenue are more 
common for the non-sellout teams. Also, the rejection of the hypothesis that marginal revenue 
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equals zero tends to be more common for sellout teams than for non-sellouts support the results. 
Accordingly, Ferguson et al. (1991) find that NHL teams may well be consistent with profit 
maximization as economic agents generally are. 
Alexander (2000) states that profit maximizing behavior is seen in MLB also: ticket prices has 
increased 92.7% since 1991 and club owners and players are getting richer at the expense of 
fans. Supporting Ferguson et al. Alexander (2000) empirically prove that MLB team owners 
are profit maximizers and set ticket prices as monopolists. Késenne (1999) argues that the most 
important difference between sports in the U.S. and Europe is that American clubs are business-
type companies seeking to make profits, whereas the only aim for most European clubs so far 
is to be successful on the field. On the basis of this chapter and the studies presented, I found 
it reasonable to believe that the teams in four major North American leagues act as profit 
maximizers. In forthcoming chapters, I will analyze the effects of non-profit maximizing 
leagues.  
 
4.2 Utility maximizing teams 
In contrast to the previous chapter Dietl, Grossmann, and Lang (2011) argue in their paper, 
Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues With Utility-Maximizing Teams, 
that empirical evidence from North American major leagues and European leagues supports 
the assumption that clubs trade-off profits and wins.  Dietl et al. (2011) present a contest model 
of a sports league in which club owners maximize an objective function given by a weighted 
sum of profits and winning percentage. This chapter follows and compacts the model. 
The core of the model is that each club maximizes its objective function given by a weighted 
sum of profits and winning percentage 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = πi(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖𝑤𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)   (4.5) 
where 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)is the utility function for team 𝑖, πi(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗), is the profit function for team 𝑖, 
𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0 is the win preference which characterizes the weight club owner 𝑖 puts on winning in 
the objective function, and 𝑤𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) is the winning percentage for team 𝑖. In the model 
presented in the previous chapter 𝛾𝑖 = 0 as teams’ full focus in profit maximizing leagues is 
on the maximization of profits.  
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Competitive balance in utility maximizing league with two teams 
Dietl et al. (2011) derive the win ratio (𝑊𝑅) from the equilibrium win percentages in two club 
league with utility maximizing club to be 
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑚1+𝛾1
𝑚2+𝛾2
     (4.6) 
where 𝑚1 is the market size for large market club and 𝑚2 is the market size for small market 
club. 𝑊𝑅 = 1 illustrates a balanced league as 𝑚1 + 𝛾1 = 𝑚2 + 𝛾2 when 𝑊𝑅 = 1. 
No matter what type of a league we consider, markets share usually differ between clubs (𝑚1 ≠
𝑚2). In a utility maximizing league, the effect of a more win-oriented behavior on competitive 
balance depends on which club is the dominant team in the equilibrium. It is clear that a more 
win-oriented behavior of the dominant club 𝑗 produces an even less balanced league as 𝑊𝑅 
recedes from one. Competitive balance increases (𝑊𝑅 approaches one) when the underdog 𝑖 
becomes more win-oriented until 𝛾𝑖 < 𝛾𝑖
′ ≡ 𝑚𝑗 − 𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 as. 
In a profit maximizing league, the large market team is the dominant team in the equilibrium 
as we know that 
𝑚1
𝑚2
> 1. If the team owner of at least one club becomes more win-oriented, it 
can have a balancing effect on the competitive balance of the league. Small market team needs 
to become more win-oriented to balance the unbalanced win ratio caused by difference between 
teams’ market share. (Dietl et al. 2011.) 
 
The effect of utility maximization on team profits 
In the first case, the large market team is a pure profit maximizer and the small market team is 
a utility maximizer (𝛾1 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾2 > 0). When 𝛾2 increase the win percentage of the small 
market team increase and the win percentage of the large market team decreases (for proof see 
Dietl et al. 1991). Thus, the revenues of the small market team increase and the revenues of the 
large market team decrease (according to Dietl et al. 
𝑑𝑅2
∗
𝑑𝛾2
> 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑑𝑅1
∗
𝑑𝛾2
< 0). Firstly, increased 
investments in playing talent for small market team cannot be compensated by the increased 
revenue and secondly, the decreased revenues of the large market team cannot be compensated 
by the lower investments in playing talent. Consequently, the profits of both clubs decrease 
and thus aggregate team profits also decrease. (Dietl et al. 1991.) 
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In the second case Dietl et al. expect the large market team to be a utility maximizer and the 
small market team to be a profit maximizer (𝛾1 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾2 = 0). In this case large market 
team fabricate higher revenues due to higher win preference 𝛾1.On the other hand, small market 
team yield lower revenues. Within certain conditions (see Dietl et al.) the higher profits of the 
large market team compensate for the lower profits of the small market team and aggregate 
team profits increase.  
In a league where both teams are utility maximizers (𝛾1 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾2 > 0) a higher win 
preference 𝛾2 for the small market team always yields lower profits for both clubs. When 𝛾1 >
𝛾2 the situation is more complex and an increase in aggregate team profits is possible. Thus, 
within a league that has utility maximizing team(s) the precondition for an increase in profits 
due to investments in talent is that the win preference of the large market club is greater than 
the win preference of the small market club (𝛾1 > 𝛾2). (Dietl et al. 1991.) 
 
4.3 The effects of salary caps on social welfare 
According to BusinessDictionary.com social welfare is the well-being of the entire society but 
it is not the same as standard of living as social welfare is more concerned with the quality of 
life. A salary cap may increase or decrease social welfare depending upon the fans' valuation 
of competitive balance and aggregate talent (Dietl, Lang & Rathke 2009). Depending on the 
preferences of the society it will put more weight on competitive balance or on aggregate talent.  
Within a balanced league (the case in which fans prefer competitive balance), a salary cap will 
reduce social welfare because it reduces the quality of the league by lowering the level of the 
competition (Dietl et al. 2009). A binding salary cap in a balanced league will decrease the 
competitiveness of the teams. Social welfare decrease as the loss of aggregate talent outweighs 
the increase in competitive balance.  
Dietl et al. (2009) also suggest that if the league suffers from an unequal distribution of talent, 
the case in which fans prefer aggregate talent, social welfare (and club profits) can be increased 
through a salary cap. Salary cap decrease salaries (team costs) and thus increases team profits. 
This increase outweigh the loss of talent and consequently social welfare increases. 
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5. Season 2014-2015 salary caps in North American major leagues 
In this chapter, I introduce salary caps that are in use in different leagues. I keep my main 
interest in the National Hockey League as the empirics part of this thesis focuses on the NHL.  
 
The National Hockey League (NHL) salary cap: 
Last lockout in the NHL was experienced in season 2012-2013 and it ended as the National 
Hockey League Player’s Association (NHLPA) and the NHL signed the new collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA).  According to the NHLPA “The Collective Bargaining 
Agreement between the NHLPA and the NHL was ratified by the NHLPA membership on 
January 12, 2013, concluding a four-month lockout by the owners of the National Hockey 
League Clubs. The Agreement sets out the terms and conditions of employment of all 
professional hockey players playing in the NHL as well as the respective rights of the NHL 
Clubs, the NHL and the NHLPA. The Agreement is set to remain in effect until September 15, 
2022, with both the NHL and the NHLPA having the right to terminate the Agreement after 
eight years.” 
The CBA sets yearly lower limit and upper limit of the salary cap in the NHL: “For each League 
Year there shall be a "Lower Limit" and an "Upper Limit" at or between which each Club must 
have an Averaged Club Salary. The range between the Lower Limit and Upper Limit shall be 
known as the "Team Payroll Range" (=PR).” The midpoint of the salary cap, time period (t) = 
0, is calculated as follows: 
(50%∗ 𝐻𝑅𝑅)−𝑃𝐵
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑏𝑠
= 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅  (5.1) 
The CBA defines hockey related revenues (HRR) for league year as the operating revenues 
from all sources, whether known or unknown, whether now in existence or created in the future, 
of each Club or the League, for or with respect to that league year, on an accrual basis, derived 
or earned from, relating to or arising directly or indirectly out of the playing of NHL hockey 
games or NHL-related events in which current NHL Players participate or in which current 
NHL Players' names and likenesses are used, by each such Club or the League, or attributable 
directly to the Club or the League from a Club Affiliated Entity or League Affiliated Entity.  
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For any and all League Years under CBA, the Players' Share shall be fifty (50) percent of 
Actual HRR and the Applicable Percentage shall be fifty (50) (the CBA). Thus, HRR is 
multiplied by 50% when calculating the midpoint of the payroll range. 
Projected benefits (PB) are defined in the CBA as the entire maximum aggregate amount of 
benefits projected to be paid to all players league-wide for such league year. During the season 
2014-2015, the number of clubs playing in the NHL (Number of clubs) is 30.  
The formula above (5.1) can only be used to calculate the midpoint of the payroll range when 
time (t) = 0. According to the CBA, the midpoint at t = 0 shall be adjusted upward by the factor 
of five (5) percent in each league year. Thus, the adjusted midpoint of the payroll range for the 
following year (t = 1) is: 
(
(50%∗𝐻𝑅𝑅)−𝑃𝐵
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑏𝑠
) ∗ 1,05 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 (5.2) 
To calculate the upper and the lower limit for t = 1 the adjusted midpoint of the payroll range 
needs to be multiplied by 85% and by 115%: 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 ∗ 85% (5.3) 
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 ∗ 115% (5.4) 
According to CBA the lower limit and the upper limit of the range shall be calculated by the 
independent accountants no later than June 30th of the immediately preceding league year, 
using preliminary HRR and projected benefits, which shall be based upon the Initial HRR 
Report for the immediately preceding League Year. 
Illustration: 
NHL has set season 2014-2015 payroll cap (upper limit) at $69 million and floor (lower limit) 
at $51 million (http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=724192). Accordingly we can calculate 
the adjusted midpoint of the payroll range for season 2014-2015 to be: 
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
2
= 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 
$69 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 + $51 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
2
= $60 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
The (unadjusted) midpoint of the payroll range calculated before June 30th 2014 over 
preliminary information about season 2013-2014: 
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𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅
1,05
= 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 
$60 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑛
1,05
≈ $57,1429 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Accordingly we can calculate the players’ share minus projected benefits: 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑏𝑠 = (0,5 ∗ 𝐻𝑅𝑅) − 𝑃𝐵 
57,1429 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 30 = 1714,29 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Consequently, players’ share minus projected benefits during the season 2013-2014 was equal 
to $1714.29 million. The amount mostly consists of Hockey Related Revenues which are 
operating revenues from all sources. 
 
Cap Number and Cap Hit in the NHL 
Many players sign multiyear contracts with teams. Players’ salary may vary during the contract 
but the amount that is included in the salary cap, the cap number, is the same every year during 
that contract. For example, according to www.nhlnumbers.com Washington Capitals player 
Troy Brouwer has a three-year contract from season 2013-2014 to season 2015-2016 with an 
overall value of $11 million.  
Table 1: Salary and Cap Number of Troy Brouwer three year contract (thousands of $) 
Season 13/14 14/15 15/16 ∑ 
Salary $3,600 $3,650 $3,750 $11,000 
Cap Number $3,667 $3,667 $3,667 $11,000 
 
As we can see from the table above, the salary varies between $3.6 million and $3.75 million 
during the three seasons but the cap number stays constant during the contract: $11 million / 3 
seasons = $3.667 million per season. 
A cap hit of a player is an amount that a team has to allocate in their total cap hit. For example, 
Marcel Goc was traded in the middle of the 2014-2015 season from Pittsburg Penguins to St. 
Louis Blues. The whole season lasts 186 days and he plays in St. Louis Blues for 74 days and 
thus (74/186 ≈ 0,4) around 40% of his salary of the season is allocated to St. Louis Blues total 
cap hit. (www.nhlnubers.com) 
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The National Basketball Association (NBA) salary cap  
According to the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and National Basketball 
Players Association (NBPA) the salary cap for 2014-15 is $63.065 million and the salary cap 
for each future season, subject to certain adjustments, will be calculated by multiplying 
projected “Basketball Related Income” by 44.74%, subtracting projected player benefits, and 
then dividing the result by 30. The determination of NBA salary cap is comparable to the NHL 
salary cap. Players’ share is 5.26% lower as in NHL the players’ share is 50% but otherwise 
the equation matches the one used in NHL. 
 
The National Football League (NFL) salary cap 
NFL collective bargaining agreement states that the salary cap for a league year shall be the 
player cost amount (percentage of all revenue) for that league year subtracting projected 
benefits for that league year, divided by the number of clubs in the league in that league year. 
Clearly, the calculation method for the salary cap in the NFL follows the same pattern as in the 
NBA and the NHL. These three leagues have some specializing features but the overall method 
is the same. 
 
The Major League Basketball (MLB) salary cap 
Baseball does not have any form of salary cap, although, it does have a luxury tax on clubs that 
yearly spend beyond a certain amount on salaries. The tax revenues go into a pool together 
with money from 2.5 percent tax on player salaries plus some local broadcast revenues from 
wealthy clubs. The pool is then distributed to 13 small-market teams. (Staudohar 1998.) 
The MLB CBA sets a minimum amount for player salaries which is defined as follows: 
Individual Player salaries shall be those as agreed upon between a Player and a Club, as 
evidenced by the execution of a Uniform Player’s Contract, subject to the following in 2015: 
The 2014 rate ($500,000) per season plus a cost of living adjustment, rounded to the nearest 
$500, provided that the cost of living adjustment shall not reduce the minimum salary below 
$500,000.   
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6. Institutional background of the NHL 
 
NHL was founded in November 26th, 1917 and it included five teams: the Montreal Canadiens, 
Montreal Wanderers, Ottawa Senators, Toronto Arenas, and Quebec Bulldogs (nhl.com). I 
shortly introduce the development of the NHL according to THE PUCK REPORT web page.  
Ever since its foundation, the NHL has grown and during its history several teams have 
relocated and/or renamed. Altogether NHL has welcomed 36 teams from which 13 have 
relocated to a new city, 11 have changed their name while remaining in the same city, and six 
have experienced financial struggles and folded their operation. All teams that have joined the 
NHL after the foundation has paid an expansion fee to the league. An expansion fee has grown 
from $12,000 paid by Chicago Blackhawks in 1926 to $80 million paid by Minnesota Wild 
and Columbus Blue Jackets in 2000. An increase in expansion fees is compensated by increased 
estimates of franchise values ranging from $130 million to $ 1 billion. At the moment, the NHL 
includes 30 teams which are divided in two (Eastern and Western) conferences and in four 
divisions (Atlantic, Metropolitan, Central, and Pacific). (THE PUCK REPORT web site.) 
During almost one hundred years of ice hockey the NHL has experienced two player strikes 
and three lockouts. I briefly introduce these labor disputes one by one using the information 
provided by http://proicehockey.about.com/. 
The strike of 1925 
The Hamilton Tigers players demanded a cash bonus of $200 for playing in the Stanley Cup 
Playoffs. Players argued that the Playoffs increased their workload (more games) and the team 
had turned a record profit. Thus, players should be compensated more open handedly. The 
NHL reacted quickly and actions were harsh: players were suspended and the Tigers’ playoff 
games were defaulted. Additionally, the players involved in a strike needed to submit written 
apology before they were allowed to return to the ice. 
The 1992 NHL Players’ Strike 
The first league wide work stoppage took place in the 1991-1992 season. The strike started by 
a vote (560 to 4) on April 1st, 1992 and ended only 10 days later on April 11th. The cancelled 
games were rescheduled and thus the whole season and playoffs were completed. After the 
strike players gain more control of marketing rights and their share of playoff revenue increased 
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from $3.2 million to $7.5million. Also, the regular season was extended from 80 games to 84 
games to give the owners a revenue boost. 
The 1994-1995 NHL Lockout 
The owners wanted to establish a “luxury tax” to discourage increasing salaries and fund small 
market clubs. A tax would be set on those teams that exceed the average NHL payroll and the 
money would be distributed among the needy franchises. The NHLPA suggested that 16 
wealthiest teams could be straight taxed to fund the poorer teams, unrelated to salaries paid by 
the teams. NHLPA proposition would not set additional rewards for smaller team payrolls and 
thus players favor straight tax rather than a salary related tax. As a result of the dispute, the 
rookie salary cap and greater restrictions on free agents were set, both benefitting the owners. 
On the other hand, the NHL dropped its demand for a luxury tax or any mechanism to control 
increasing salaries. 
The 2004-2005 NHL Lockout 
This was the first labor dispute that cancelled the whole season and no Stanley Cup winner was 
declared. NHL owners demanded an inflexible cap on salaries, claiming that the player costs 
require up to 75% of team revenues. The NHLPA was not going to accept any kind of salary 
cap and announced that players are ready to drop the whole season if necessary. During the 
season rumors and headlines suggested that the players’ association began to be more 
compliant towards a salary cap. On February 18th, the first ever cancellation of the season was 
announced. Tentative agreement including the upper and lower limit was announced on July 
13th, 2005. The 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement included a salary cap and players’ 
association was seen as a loser in the preceding negotiations. The salary cap guaranteed a fixed 
percentage (54%-57%) of the league revenues every year. Revenues increased notably in the 
years after consequently resulting in higher incomes for players (57% of revenues).  
The 2012-2013 NHL Lockout 
As the 2005 CBA expired in September 15th, 2012 the NHL and the NHLPA needed to resolve 
some issues that had occurred during the 2005 CBA. Firstly, the Players’ share was under 
negotiation. The NHL considered 57% players’ share too high as in other professional sports 
it is 50% or less. The NHLPA announced that they will agree on a 50% players share and after 
the negotiations the share was agreed to be 50%. Secondly, a salary cap floor caused problems 
for money-losing teams that would like to pay smaller salaries for their players. In the 2013 
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CBA the payroll floor is set at 85% of the adjusted midpoint of the payroll (see Chapter 5). 
Thirdly, The Guaranteed Contracts were under dispute. A player is guaranteed to earn every 
dollar that is agreed in the contract. The only option for the team that is not interest in the 
player’s services anymore is to buy the player out from the contract. This can be expensive as 
player contracts can be as long as Ilya Kovalchuk’s 17 season contract (which was shortened 
to 15 seasons by the NHL). In the 2013 CBA player contracts were agreed to be limited to 
seven-to-eight years. Fourthly, exact NHL revenues are determined at the end of the season 
and then the true numbers become clear. Players pay a percent of their salary (12.5% in 2010-
2011) to the escrow which is divided after the season to guarantee that the targeted spilt came 
true. Players were concerned that troubled franchises drag down overall revenue and thus they 
wanted to eliminate the escrow payment. In the 2013 CBA the escrow mechanism is calculated 
in the same manner as it was under the 2005 CBA. Fifthly, players wanted to increase revenue 
sharing to even the financial playing field. Especially the rich teams were reluctant but some 
concessions were made and revenue sharing increased in the 2013 CBA. 
 
6.1 NHL salary cap 
In this chapter, I shortly introduce the features of the NHL salary cap before going into more 
detailed analysis. In a nutshell NHL salary cap is a hard salary cap that includes upper and 
lower limits for player costs. The midpoint of the payroll is calculated as a percentage of league 
wide revenues which is multiplied by 115% and 85% to get upper and lower limits. 
Additionally, NHL is considered a profit maximizing league as showed by Ferguson et al. 
(1991) and supported by other empirical studies. 
Hard salary cap: 
The NHL salary cap is a hard salary cap that cannot be exceeded without consequences. There 
is an upper (red curve in Figure 4) and lower limit (blue curve in Figure 4) defined by the salary 
cap and a team has to fit their player budget within those borders. Multiyear player contracts 
provide a possibility for teams to fractionate their cap number and salaries paid as presented in 
the table 1. 
Two club model with marginal revenues and salary caps is presented in Figure 4. X is a large 
market club and Y is a small market club. Job supply is presented on the horizontal axis. 
Differing from Késennes illustration, Figure 4 presents the whole job supply not just top 
players’ job supply. The vertical axis’ illustrate player costs for team X and Y. Marginal 
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revenue curves are downward sloping due to the decreasing marginal revenues of additional 
players. Salary caps (high and low) are curves as they are calculated as upper (lower) limit 
divided by the number of players playing for the team. 
Figure 4: NHL salary cap system 
 
Figure 4 is a modified version of Késenne’s (2000) illustration. In Figure 4, on the vertical 
axis’s C = team player costs and on the horizontal axis L = labor (the number of players). There 
is no breakdown between top players and regular players as both types are expected to 
contribute to the teams’ success and increase the amount of talent in the team. Additional to 
the Késennes study lower limits of team salary caps are included in the figure as blue curves, 
and red curves are upper limits on player salaries. Per player salary caps are not included in the 
figure. Maximum amount that can be spent on one player is 20 percent of the salary cap and 
minimum per player salary is $550,000 during season 2014-2015 (the NHL CBA). 
All possible market balances are found in the blue area in the middle of Figure 4. Team salary 
caps form the upper and lower limits for a player spending. Point A is the labor distribution 
without the NHL salary cap where large market club owns most labor. Point B is the labor 
distribution with team total maximum amount that can be spent in labor (comparable to CAP 
in Figure 1). The lower limit (blue curve) is binding for small market team. It evens the 
distribution of labor and raises player costs when compared with market balance B. New 
 30 
 
market balance is found somewhere in the blue area. Arguably, point C is the market balance 
with upper and lower limits. At point C, large team club is at its maximum player costs and 
small team is at its minimum player costs. 
Percentage of revenue cap: 
In the last collective bargaining agreement NHL and NHLPA has agreed that the players’ share 
is 50% of the hockey related revenues. The percentage has decreased since the introduction of 
the salary cap after the NHL lockout in 2004-2005. A percentage of revenue cap guarantees 
that more money the owners make, the more money the players can earn (Staudohar 2005). 
This gives an incentive for the league and the players to cooperate in order to create more value.  
Profit maximizing league 
In this study, the NHL is considered as a profit maximizing league. Teams are expected to 
maximize their profits rather than utility or social welfare. In the sports literature there is no 
clear consensus on this topic but I found that most of the academic field support profit 
maximization in North American leagues (see Ferguson et al. 1991, Késenne 1999 and 
Alexander 2000). Teams’ demands for salary cap support profit maximizing behavior as it 
lowers player costs and thus I argue that NHL teams are profit maximizers. 
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7. Empirics 
In the empirical part of the thesis, I empirically explore if the theoretical factors presented in 
the previous literature have been put into effect in the NHL since the introduction of the salary 
cap. My study will complement the master’s thesis: “The Effect of the Changes in the 2005 
Collective Bargaining Agreement on the Labor Markets of the NHL Players” (Kaijalainen 
2013). Also, I will preliminary discuss the causes of the changes in the 2013 CBA.  My main 
aim is to find out if the NHL salary cap has balanced the competition between the teams and if 
it has limited the overall costs of the teams. This will be done by analyzing the individual player 
salaries that can be combined into teams’ player costs.  
 
7.1 Data set 
The data set used in this thesis is collected from different sports statistics websites. USA Today 
(http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nhl/) is my main source as it collects individual and team 
salaries from 2000-2001 season to 2013-2014 season. Data is completed with some additional 
information from other sports statistics websites witch are: http://www.hockey-reference.com/, 
http://www.spotrac.com/nhl/, http://blackhawkzone.com/home/index.php and 
http://www.quanthockey.com/. Payroll data on the following table is mainly provided by the 
USA Today website and data on team success is collected from the sports statistics sites listed 
above. 
Table 2: Player salary data set 
Season Observations % 
2001 700 7.47 
2002 700 7.47 
2003 721 7.69 
2004 748 7.98 
2005 Lockout 
season 
Lockout 
season 
2006 742 7.92 
2007 725 7.74 
2008 708 7.55 
2009 722 7.70 
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2010 702 7.49 
2011 735 7.84 
2012 708 7.55 
2013 714 7.62 
2014 747 7.97 
Total 9372 100 
 
Teams’ playing roster in the NHL may comprise from 20 to 23 players. As there are 30 teams 
in the NHL this means total of 600 to 690 players in all playing rosters together. Naturally there 
is some level of turnover in rosters during the season and in this data set all the players have 
had an influence on their teams’ success. The whole cost of the player is allocated to the team 
that owned their contract last, during that season. Considering the overall cost of a team this is 
a bias but in terms of this thesis it would be too laborious to fix it considering a possible benefit. 
Player salaries in the data set are true salaries paid by the team and not the cap hit allocated to 
the salary cap. This better reflects the overall costs of the teams per season and naturally at the 
end of the contract the accumulated amount of the true salaries and the cap hit is the same as 
presented in the table 1.  Also, season bonuses paid by the team are added to the player salaries 
in the data set. 
The data set provides a comprehensive collection of season salaries. Some player expenses are 
left outside the data set like those players that have not contributed to the team success in the 
NHL games. For example, players that are signed for a NHL team but played the whole season 
in the American Hockey League (AHL), which is considered a developmental circuit for the 
NHL, are left out from the data set. Many players in the data set played some part of the season 
in the AHL but also played games in the NHL and thus contributed to the overall success of 
the NHL team. The USA Today web site does not specifically determine what the limit for 
approval in the data set. In my random sample of the 5 lowest paid players per every season, I 
did not find any players that played less than ten games in the NHL during that season. The 
reason why I chose the lowest paid players to be tested is that they are usually the ones that 
play most of the season in the AHL. As all the lowest paid players played in the NHL during 
the season, this data set is relevant to illustrate the development of the player costs and relations 
between player costs and team success.  
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Throughout the examination period, the NHL consists of 30 teams. After the 2010-2011 season 
Atlanta Thrashers moved to Winnipeg and changed its name to Winnipeg Jets. Also, some 
teams have changed their names but this is not relevant considering my research as I focus on 
the competition and player costs on the league level, not on the individual team level. 
 
7.2 Research questions 
The empirical research aims to answer the following questions: 
1. Did the 2005 NHL salary cap balance competition? 
2. Has the 2005 NHL salary cap limited the overall player costs of the teams? 
2.1 What are the results of limited player costs to the team owners and to the 
players? 
Research questions will be presented and analyzed in more detail in the analysis chapter. 
 
7.3 Research methods 
In the analysis chapter, I use statistical analysis methods and measures to illustrate differences 
before and after the salary cap. The values given by statistical methods and measures are 
displayed in different graphs and scatter plots Teams that are playing in playoffs during the 
season are considered successful. Attendance in playoffs is the minimum requirement for every 
team as it is the only way to compete for success and the Stanley Cup in the NHL.  
Causality running from payroll to team success would be questionable and thus I do not use 
regression analysis as a research method. The presence of long term contracts and restrictive 
labor market rules prevent the identification of unambiguous one-way causality (Hall, 
Szymanski & Zimblaist 2002). These conditions match the NHL player markets and thus I 
believe that higher spending will not automatically lead to a greater success.   
As mentioned earlier, payroll data is collected from 2000-2001 to 2013-2014. This time period 
is divided in two or three time periods in different figures presented later. When the data set is 
divided in two time periods the watershed is the 2004-2005 season which was cancelled and 
followed by the season with the first salary cap. When the data set is divided in three time 
periods, 2004-2005 season is another watershed and another is the end of season 2008-2009. 
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Consequently, the data set is divided as evenly as possible so that all three periods include 
almost the same amount of data. 
Average (mean) 
When analyzing question 1, I firstly calculate team average (mean) payrolls to illustrate team 
spending before and after the salary cap. Team averages are calculated by dividing combined 
team payrolls by the number of teams. In case of all teams the number of teams is 30 and in 
case of playoff teams the number of teams is 16. 
Standard deviation 
Question 1 is also analyzed by the payroll standard deviations of all teams and playoff teams. 
Standard deviation measures how spread the team payrolls are. Standard deviations before and 
after the salary cap illustrate the difference in the dispersion of team payrolls and player 
salaries. This variable gives an opportunity to discuss the changes in the payroll dispersion of 
successful and non-successful teams before and after the 2005 salary cap. 
Pearson product-moment correlation 
Pearson product-moment correlation (referred as correlation in this study) shows the linear 
dependence between two variables. It gets values between -1 and 1. -1 presents a perfect linear 
negative dependency. 0 means that there is no dependency at all. Value 1 means that there is a 
perfect linear dependency. In this study, correlation is used to show relations between team 
payrolls and success. 
Covariance 
Covariance illustrates how much two random variables change together. In this study, 
covariance is used to show the difference in changes between a payroll and ranking after the 
regular season before and after the 2005 salary cap.  
Lorenz curve 
Lorenz curve illustrates the cumulative distribution of the value being measured. A vertical 
axis illustrates the cumulative share of the value being measured, for example points. A 
horizontal axis illustrates a cumulative share of teams or players from the lowest share to the 
highest share. In Lorenz curve graphs, there is also an equality line in each. Equality line 
illustrates the equal distribution of the value being measured. Accordingly, equality line is a 
45-degree line cutting the graph from the lower left corner to the higher right corner. 
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Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient illustrates the inequality of distribution of the value being measured. The 
Gini coefficient can get a value from 0 to 1. 1 means that all income (points during regular 
seasons) is distributed to one player (team). Value 0 means that all income (points during 
regular seasons) are perfectly distributed among players (teams). The Gini coefficient is the 
proportion of the area under the equality line. To calculate Gini coefficient the area under the 
Lorenz curve is needed. Second, the area between equality line and Lorenz curve is calculated 
as 0.5 (the area under equality line) minus the area under the Lorenz curve. Third, divide the 
area between equality line and the Lorenz curve by 0.5 (the area under equality line). The result 
is the Gini coefficient which is between 0 and 1 depending on the equality of distribution. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure competitive balance during regular 
seasons. It illustrates the most equal distribution of wins. This method is adapted from Larsen, 
Fenn and Spenner (2006). According to the authors, HHI is a quadratic summation of all firm 
market shares in an industry and defined as 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑀𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
    (7.1) 
where 𝑀𝑆𝑖
2 is the market share of the 𝑖th firm, and N is the number of firms. In this study 
output of a team is measured in total wins. Following Larsen et al. (2006) a team’s market share 
is its percentage of wins in the league in a given season. Accordingly, the definition of HHI is 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ (
2𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖
𝑁𝐺
)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
    (7.2) 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖 is the number of wins for the 𝑖th team, N is the number of teams in the league, 
and 𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺is the equal number of games played by each team during a given season. 
Comparison of HHI and the most equal distribution should disclose if during the season wins 
are divided in a more equal manner after the 2005 salary cap.  
In addition to the methods mentioned above, I use column charts and player positional variables 
to illustrate changes in player costs. Column charts illustrate how team values have developed 
before and after the 2005 salary cap. Player positional variable show how the salary cap is 
related to player salaries and positional relations between them.  
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8. Analysis 
 
8.1 Is competition in the NHL more balanced after the introduction of the 2005 
salary cap? 
Team owners highlight the balancing effect of salary caps. Recent discussion on the academic 
field (see for example Késenne 2000, Larsen et al. 2006, Dietl et al. 2012) supports the 
hypothesis of more balanced competition after the introduction of a salary cap. In this chapter, 
my aim is to find out if there is empirical evidence to support this claim in the NHL after the 
2005 salary cap. A salary cap only affects player costs. Thus, for a salary cap to be able to 
balance competition there needs to be a relation between player costs and success. Firstly, I 
show that the relation of payroll and team success during regular season exists and it decreased 
after the salary cap. Accordingly, a salary cap may have a relation with competitive balance. 
Causality tests of pay and performance are left for future studies. Secondly, I show and discuss 
the changes in competitive balance after the salary cap.  
 
8.1.1 Relation of team payroll and success 
In this chapter, I illustrate the relation of team payrolls and team success. My aim is to show 
the difference between the payrolls of successful and non-successful teams. This is done by 
analyzing the payrolls of playoff and non-playoff teams and regular season success of teams 
before and after the 2005 salary cap.  
8.1.1.1 Have seasonal average payrolls and Stanley Cup winners’ payrolls approached each 
other? 
Figure 5 shows the development of teams’ average payrolls, playoff teams’ average payroll 
and Stanley Cup winners’ average payroll. The first vertical dash line in Figure 5 illustrates the 
imposition of the 2005 salary cap and the second vertical dash line between 2012 and 2013 
illustrates the readjustments made to the salary cap in the 2013 CBA. Dash lines are also 
presented in previous figures. 
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Figure 5: Teams’ average payrolls  
 
Clearly, Stanley Cup winners’ payroll has greater dispersion before the 2005 salary cap than 
after. After 2008 Stanley Cup winners’ payroll seem to diverge again from average payrolls 
and every year it is notably greater than averages presented in the figure. After the 2005 salary 
cap, all the diagrams seem to approach each other. Again after 2008 they seem to diverge and 
gaps between the graphs stay pretty constant. The average of playoff teams’ payrolls are greater 
than the average payrolls of all teams during the whole examination period. Excluding the 
Stanley Cup winners’ payroll graph before the 2005 salary cap, all graphs have an upward 
sloping trend. The 2005 salary cap lowered the level of average salaries but did not change the 
upward sloping trends. 2013 CBA does not have any influence on graphs presented in Figure 
5. 
8.1.1.2 Is there a difference in the standard deviations of successful and non-successful teams? 
Figure 6 shows changes in payroll average standard deviations. Black line illustrates all league 
teams’ average and blue line illustrates playoff teams’ average. Teams that get to play playoff 
games are considered successful in this study. Playoff entry is the only ways to give your team 
a possibility to compete for the Stanley Cup.  
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Figure 6: Teams average payrolls’ standard deviation 
 
Team payrolls approached each other as 2005 salary cap was implemented. Accordingly, there 
is a notable drop in standard deviations after the introduction of 2005 salary cap as we can see 
from Figure 6. Both, before and after 2005 curves are upward sloping meaning that differences 
between team salaries are increasing. From 2001 to 2014 playoff teams have greater payroll 
standard deviation compared with the average of all teams’ payroll standard deviation. As 
expected, the gap between two averages is smaller after the 2005 salary cap. This is an expected 
result when a salary cap includes maximum and minimum limits for spending. 
The difference between the payrolls of successful and non-successful teams decreased after the 
salary cap. This is shown in Figure 5 as clearly both types of teams’ payrolls approached each 
other. Figure 6 supports this finding as average standard deviations decreased and approached 
each other.  
8.1.1.3 What is the relation of an average payroll and ranking after the regular season? 
In Figure 7 vertical axis presents the average payroll and horizontal axis presents teams’ 
standing after the regular season. For example, an average payroll of 𝑥th team on the horizontal 
axis is calculated as the average of the payrolls of 𝑥th teams during the seasons in question.  
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Figure 7: Teams' average payroll and ranking after regular season 
 
As we can see from Figure 7 average salaries before the 2005 salary cap are more diffused than 
after 2005. Polynomial trendlines are both downward sloping which illustrates that there is a 
negative relation between ranking after the regular season and team payroll. Lower goodness-
of-fit (0.6462) for trendline before 2005 is due to the greater diffusion of averages. After the 
salary cap, there is a smaller negative relation between a payroll and ranking after regular 
season according to Figure 7. Team payrolls are greater but especially on top 16 (playoff teams) 
negative relation seems to be less of importance after the 2005 salary cap. 
Figure 8 shows the same relation as Figure 7. In Figure 8 data is divided in three sets and most 
of all after the 2005 salary cap observations are divided in two based on a year of observation. 
Data set and trendline marked as red is the same as in Figure 7. Data set marked as black in 
Figure 7 is now divided to present two different data sets and trendlines in Figure 8, black and 
blue. The blue set presents average payrolls during seasons 2006-2009 and black set presents 
average payrolls during seasons 2010-2014. 
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Figure 8: Teams’ average payroll and ranking after regular season, three periods 
 
Blue set in Figure 8 clearly shows the balancing effect of the 2005 salary cap on payrolls. The 
trendline is not as steep as other two trendlines. As we can see from the figure, average payrolls 
of top positions dropped notably and the payrolls of lower rankings increased. Accordingly, 
NHL can be said to be more balanced after the introduction of 2005 salary cap in terms of 
average payrolls. The black set illustrates later years in the data set. It shows that as the salary 
cap has increased and widened, the trendline has turned steeper again. Average payrolls in the 
black data set are notably higher than in other two sets and payrolls are less balanced than in 
the blue data set. Arguably there is a negative relation between teams’ average payroll and 
ranking after the regular season as presented in Figure 8. 
8.1.1.4 How much does payroll and standing after regular season change together? 
Payroll and standing after regular season are expected to have negative relation because in 
previous figures a bigger payroll is shown to have a relation with smaller ranking. Figure 10 
shows the covariance of ranking after the regular season and payroll. The smaller the value the 
greater negative relation payroll and ranking have during the regular season.  
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Figure 9: Ranking after regular season and payroll covariance 
 
As Figure 9 shows covariance approached zero after the 2005 salary cap meaning that negative 
relation of payroll and ranking decreased. After 2005 covariance has slowly diverged from zero 
again. Figure 9 supports previous findings about the balancing effect of NHL salary cap on 
payrolls. Balancing effect was notable when the salary cap was introduced but it has become 
less meaningful ever since. 2013 CBA has not showed any notable changes on the findings 
presented so far. 
8.1.1.5 Has the correlation between a number of playoff rounds and payroll changed? 
Figure 10 presents two correlations: black line is the correlation between a payroll and number 
of playoff rounds for playoff teams and red line is the same correlation for all teams that 
attended the season. 
Figure 10: Payroll and number of playoff rounds correlations 
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As we can see from Figure 10, payroll correlates positively with a number of playoff rounds 
when we consider the league-wide correlation. At its minimum, the correlation is 0.2 and at its 
maximum it is 0.6. Before the 2005 salary cap correlation is decreasing but after the salary cap 
correlation has had an increasing trend.  
Playoff teams’ correlation of payroll and number of playoff rounds is more unstable. What is 
interesting is that several years’ the correlation is negative. This also has an increasing trend 
after the salary cap but as it is bumpier than in the case of all teams too much conclusions 
cannot be made.  
Figure 10 suggests that payroll has greater relation with a number of playoff rounds among all 
NHL teams than among playoff teams. The decreasing trends of both correlations before the 
salary cap propose that greater investments do not correlate with success in a same way that 
they used to during previous seasons. This might be one of the reasons why team owners 
insisted on a salary cap. Overall, the relation of payroll and success in the NHL during the 
regular season decreased after the 2005 salary cap as shown in previous figures.  
 
8.1.2 Regular season competition 
In this chapter, I show that the competition has balanced after the 2005 salary cap during regular 
season. Analysis is based on HHI, Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients which all represent 
equality measures of a different kind. 
8.1.2.1 Did the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index change after the 2005 salary cap? 
Figure 11 reflects the distribution of wins during the regular season. Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Index (HHI) is illustrated on the vertical axis and season is shown on the horizontal axis. The 
most equal distribution is 1/N which in the case of the NHL is equal to 1/30 = 0.03333. 
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Figure 11: NHL teams' wins Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
As we can see from Figure 11 there is a drop in the values of the HHI after the 2005 salary cap. 
We can see that the red, before the salary cap, series is above the level of the black, after the 
salary cap, series. During the period before the salary cap HHI is more than 0.035 and after the 
salary cap every season HHI is less than 0.035. Table 3 below shows the average values of 
HHIs before and after the salary cap. 
Table 3: Average Herfindahl-Hirshman Indexes of wins 
Time period Average HHI 
Before the 2005 salary cap 0.03617 
After the 2005 salary cap 0.03443 
After the salary cap HHI is closer to the most equal distribution of wins in the NHL (1/N). 
Accordingly, the distribution of wins has become more equal after the salary cap. The 
conclusion that the NHL is a more balanced league in terms of wins during the regular season 
after the 2005 salary cap can be drawn from the change in HHI. 
8.1.2.2 Are points after the regular season more evenly distributed after the 2005 salary cap? 
During regular seasons, points are relatively evenly distributed between the teams playing in 
the NHL (see Appendix 1). After the 2005 salary cap cumulative distribution of points has 
become slightly more even. Gini coefficients are gathered to Table 4 and it will be referred to 
in the future chapters of this thesis. The Gini coefficients of distribution of points after the 
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regular season during three time periods in Table 4 column 2 illustrate the changes in the 
distribution of points. 
Table 4: Gini coefficients 
 
Question 1 
Is the competition more balanced after the salary cap? 
Question 2 
What is the effect of 
limited player costs?  
Regular season 
competition 
Playoff competition 
Effect on 
teams 
Effect on 
players 
Time 
period 
Distribution 
of points 
Distribution 
of 
standings 
Distribution 
of playoff 
rounds (all 
teams) 
Distribution 
of playoff 
rounds 
(playoff 
teams) 
Team 
payrolls 
Player 
salaries 
Before the 
salary cap 
(01-04) 
0.0816 0.2476 0.4039 0.3122 0.2140 0.4736 
After the 
salary cap 
(06-09) 
0.0602 0.2282 0.4228 0.3340 0.1199 0.4565 
After the 
salary cap 
(10-14) 
0.0586 0.2421 0.4622 0.3795 0.1010 0.4478 
 
As we can see from the table above, the Gini coefficients of point distribution are relatively 
low. This means that during regular seasons the point distribution is comparatively equal. Table 
4 shows that the Gini coefficient of point distribution decreases after the 2005 salary cap and 
continues to decrease. Distribution of points becomes more equal after the salary cap. The 
difference is arguably low as the Gini coefficient is already before the salary cap less than 0.1. 
8.1.2.3 Are standings after regular season more evenly distributed after the 2005 salary cap? 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of standings after regular season. Red curve illustrates seasons 
2000-2004 and black curve illustrates seasons 2005-2009. Blue line is the 45-degree line 
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showing the most even distribution. Naturally first position is preferable for teams after regular 
season. Thus, standings are presented in opposite order so that cumulative distribution fits 
Lorenz curve illustration.  
Figure 12: Standing after regular season 
 
As we can see from Figure 12 distribution of positions after regular season is more balanced 
after 2005. The balancing effect is the most notable within teams that collect 50 to 80 percent 
of the cumulative standings. This is in line with previous findings in this chapter. The Gini 
coefficients of distribution of standings are presented in Table 4 in column 3. 
Drop in Gini coefficient tells that standings are more evenly distributed after the salary cap. On 
the other hand, Gini coefficient during seasons from 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 increased close 
to the value before the salary cap. Accordingly, during seasons 2010-2014 Lorenz curve moves 
closer to the before 2005 curve and thus competition during regular season can be said to 
become less balanced again (see Appendix 2).  
In this chapter, I have empirically shown that the regular season competition did become more 
balanced after the introduction of the 2005 salary cap. This change is proved by the more equal 
distribution of wins during regular season, points after regular season, and standings after 
regular season. In the following chapter, I analyze the competitive balance during playoffs and 
the changes in it. 
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8.1.3 Playoff competition 
In a competitively balanced league playoff rounds should be distributed equally. Playoff rounds 
correlate strongly with success. With zero playoff rounds in the NHL, the team has had zero 
competitive success as reaching the playoff stage is the minimum target when competing for 
the Stanley Cup. Economically playoff rounds are important as tickets can be sold with a higher 
price and most games are sold out. Playoff games also bring coverage and fans are more 
enthusiastic about the games during playoff season. Overall, a team cannot be totally satisfied 
with its season if it has not reached the playoff stage. 
Every season there are a total of 30 playoff rounds. In the calculation method of this thesis, 
every team that is eliminated at the first round gets value one. Teams that are eliminated at the 
second playoff round get value two. As there are 16 teams every season that reach the playoff 
stage it means total of four rounds: at first round there are 16 teams that make 8 pairs and 
accordingly 8 teams are eliminated at the first round. At the second round 4 teams get 
eliminated and at the third round 2 teams get eliminated. Accordingly there are 2 teams left at 
the fourth round and another will be the Stanley Cup winner. Thus, the total of playoff rounds 
is calculated as follows: 8*1 + 4*2 + 2*3 + 2*4 = 30. There are 30 teams in the NHL and thus 
on average every team should get one playoff round per season in a competitively balanced 
league. 
8.1.3.1 How are playoff rounds distributed among NHL teams? 
Gini coefficients presented in Table 4 column 4 illustrate the changes in the competitive 
balance during playoffs among all teams. The Gini coefficient has steadily increased during 
the three time periods presented in Table 4 column 4. Consequently, the distribution of playoff 
rounds has become less even. The Gini coefficients of the distribution of playoff rounds among 
playoff teams in Table 4 column 5 also suggest that the competition during playoffs has become 
less balanced after the 2005 salary cap. Supportive Lonrenz curves are presented in Appendix 
3 and 4. 
Gini coefficients in Table 4 column 5 are smaller than in column 4. This is logical as teams 
with zero playoff rounds are excluded from the data set. The Gini coefficient has increased 
during three time periods. Distribution of playoff rounds among all teams and playoff teams 
both have increased. Thus, empirical evidence supports the conclusion of less balanced playoff 
competition. 
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8.1.3.2 Is there any change in distribution of wins during playoffs? 
Figure 13 shows the distribution of wins during playoffs. A Gini coefficient in theory can get 
any value from 0 to 1. In this case 0 and 1 are not possible as each team needs 4 wins to get to 
the next round. Hence, both teams playing in the Stanley Cup finals have collected 12 wins and 
the Stanley Cup winner has 16 wins at the end of the playoffs. The Stanley cup winner has 0 
to 12 losses depending on the equality of series’. The Gini coefficient is still varying as every 
playoff series has 4 to 7 games depending on the distribution of wins in that series. In theory, 
a salary cap should even the distribution of talent and thus playoff series’ should be more equal. 
Consequently, more playoff games should be played as it takes more games for a team to win 
4 games in one series. 
Figure 13: Wins during playoffs Gini coefficients 
 
Figure 13 shows that there is not much difference in the distribution of wins during playoffs 
before and after the 2005 salary cap. Distribution seems to become less equal shortly after the 
salary cap and later slowly turn into more equal. Accordingly there is a decreasing trend after 
the salary cap. The period averages of Gini coefficients (see Appendix 3) support this finding. 
Altogether, differences are so small that not much conclusions can be made. Based on Figure 
13 I conclude that the distribution of wins during playoffs has not changed. 
 
8.1.4 Discussion and recommendations 
According to the empirical evidence presented earlier the relation of a payroll and success in 
the NHL has decreased after the 2005 salary cap. All empirical evidence in Chapter 8.1.1 
supports this result. A decrease in the relation is a logical result as the salary cap forced team 
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payrolls to be more equal. The increase in league wide revenues resulted as a wider salary cap 
in the NHL and team payrolls started to diverge again. As empirically shown, the increase in 
league revenues increased team payrolls and relation of payroll and regular season success. 
Following the findings I argue that setting a narrow salary cap with upper and lower limits on 
team payrolls is a way to decrease the relation of payroll and success. If the target is to maintain 
a low relation, the salary cap needs to be readjusted when the league-wide sales increase. In 
the case of the NHL, when targeting for a smaller relation between payroll and success there 
are two options. First option is to lower the players’ share which results in lower payrolls. 
Second option is to narrow the gap between minimum payroll and maximum payroll. The first 
option is harmful for player salaries and thus would face resistance by the NHLPA. The second 
option forces small teams to spend more and large teams to spend less than they would be 
willing to (see Figure 4, the NHL salary cap system). Thus, option two is not in the favor of 
team owners and the NHL will not propose it. Also, a hybrid model with lower players’ share 
and narrower gap between the caps is possible. Arguably, then the harms and the benefits of a 
salary cap would be experienced by the owners and the players.  
Academic literature suggests that regular season competition is more balanced after a salary 
cap. Empirical evidence from the NHL supports this suggestion as presented earlier. Wins are 
divided more equally during regular season after the salary cap as shown by the HHI in Figure 
11. Regular season points are also distributed more equally as shown by decreased Gini 
coefficients. Additionally, standings after regular season are distributed more equally. Only 
empirical finding that is not supporting the balancing effect of the NHL salary cap is that Gini 
coefficient of standings after the regular season increased when moving form seasons 06-09 to 
seasons 10-14. Altogether, I found that there is empirical evidence to support the balancing 
effect of the 2005 salary cap. Thus, I conclude that the 2005 salary cap had a balancing effect 
on the regular season competition in the NHL. 
Distribution of playoff rounds suggests that competition in playoffs is less balanced after the 
2005 salary cap. The same result is found with all teams and playoff teams. Additionally, the 
distribution of wins in playoffs has not become more balanced after the salary cap. Comparison 
between these results and the correlation of a payroll and number of playoff rounds of playoff 
teams (Figure 10) support each other. Figure 10 suggests that pay and performance during 
playoffs are not as strongly correlated as they are during regular season. Empirical evidence 
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about the playoff competition supports the suggestion as the salary cap did not make the playoff 
competition more equal. 
I have now comprehensively analyzed and discussed the relation of payroll and success, 
competitive balance during regular season, and competitive balance during playoffs. The 
theoretical results of the 2005 NHL salary cap on a competitive balance have empirical support 
during the regular season. There is no empirical evidence that the salary cap did balance the 
competition during playoffs. In the following chapter, I analyze and discuss if the NHL salary 
cap limited player costs in the NHL and what are the consequences to the NHL team owners 
and to the NHL players. 
 
8.2 Has the salary cap limited the overall player costs of the teams in the NHL? 
In the 21st century the increase of player salaries has been rapid as we can see from Figure 14. 
The salary cap was set to decrease this phenomenon as it expresses limits to the team spending 
on players. It also limits the maximum amount that can be paid to one player and sets a lower 
limit on personal salaries. The figure shows that the salary cap set at 2005 decreased combined 
team salaries to almost the same level where they were in 2001. On the other hand yearly 
increase in salaries has been comparable to the time before the salary cap.  
Figure 14: Combined team salaries in the NHL 
 
The general impact of a salary cap is considered positive. A salary cap improves competitive 
balance which should make the league more attractive, levels player salary distribution, and 
guarantees a reasonable profit rate for all the clubs as costs decrease. Clearly superstar players 
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who have had the biggest salaries do not prefer salary caps as their salaries will decrease the 
most. Also, introduction of a salary cap will lead to a departure from Pareto-optimal point. 
(Késenne 2000.) 
Arguably owners’ profits increased since the player costs decreased due to the salary cap. The 
2005 salary cut was about 22% of the players’ salaries suggesting that owner’s incomes 
increased by 22% of the players combined salaries. This finding is in line with Staudohar’s 
(2005) statement that NHL spent 76 percent of its revenue on player salaries before the 2005 
salary cap. 76 percent is notably higher than in other professional sports in North America. For 
example in the NBA players’ share that time was about 58 percent of revenue (Staudohar 2005). 
Clearly, the 2005 salary cap decreased the overall player costs of the teams in the NHL. 
Percentage and total amount of payrolls both decreased as shown above. Combined team 
salaries increased rapidly after the 2005 salary cap as shown in Figure 14. Even though 
combined team salaries rapidly exceeded the 2004 level percentage remained at 54-57% as 
agreed in the 2005 CBA. Thus, the decrease in players’ share meant an increase in team owners’ 
profits. 
Figure 15 illustrates the NHL teams’ payroll standard deviation. Bigger the deviation the bigger 
the differences between team payrolls. A salary cap is expected to decrease standard deviation. 
Figure 15: Teams’ payroll standard deviation 
 
Standard deviation notably dropped after the introduction of the 2005 salary cap. The drop was 
about ten million in numbers which corresponds to about 62%. The trend of teams’ payroll 
standard deviation was rapidly increasing before 2005 as we can see from Figure 15. After 
2005 trend is also increasing but not as fast as before 2005. Teams in the NHL seem to have 
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balanced their spending after the introduction of the 2005 salary. More even salary distribution 
between teams is expected as clear limits to teams’ payrolls are introduced. Too much 
conclusions cannot be made about the trend after the 2013 CBA but the standard deviation 
seems to be stagnant or even decreasing.  
The Gini coefficients of team payrolls’ are presented in Table 4 column 6. The decrease from 
0.2140 to 0.1010 illustrate the balancing effect of a salary cap on team payrolls. The decrease 
was more notable right after the 2005 salary cap supporting that the decrease is caused by the 
salary cap. Decreasing Gini coefficient support the notion of increasingly evenly distributed 
payrolls in the NHL. Supportive Lorenz curve is presented in Appendix 5. 
According to the evidence presented in this chapter I conclude that the NHL salary cap has 
lowered the player costs. It lowered the total costs for a few season but increase in league wide 
revenues revoked this decrease in no more than four season. Players’ share of league wide 
revenues has remained at the level which is agreed in the 2005 and 2013 CBAs. This means 
that owners’ profits and players’ salaries grow together as revenues grow. In the following 
chapters, I analyze the consequences of limiting the player costs in two different chapters. First 
I analyze the consequences to the NHL team owners and second I analyze the consequences to 
the NHL players.  
 
8.2.1 What are the consequences to the NHL team owners? 
Figure 16 shows the development of the average franchise value of NHL teams. Values are 
collected from forbes.com which annually lists NHL team franchise values. The data on Figure 
16 encompasses seasons from 1999-2000 to 2013-2014. 
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Figure 16: Average franchise value of NHL teams (data from www.forbes.com) 
 
The average franchise value was stagnant during the period presented before the 2005 salary 
cap. This might be due to rapidly increasing player salaries which lowered the owners’ share 
of revenues. After the 2005 salary cap, the average franchise value moderately increased until 
2012 when the 2005 CBA came to its end. During this period players’ share was tied to league 
wide revenues and increased as revenues increased. Maximum players’ share during the 2005 
CBA was 57% and it guaranteed the rest of the revenue to the team owners’. After the 2013 
CBA, the average franchise value has increased rapidly as illustrated in Figure 16. In 2013 
CBA players’ share is fixed at 50% and this possibly correlates with the rapidly increasing 
average franchise value.  
According to the average franchise value presented in Figure 16 team owners’ seem to be the 
biggest winners after the salary cap was introduced in the NHL. Most probably a fixed salary 
cap positively affects the valuation of NHL franchises but there might be several additional 
reasons to the increase in franchise values. Estimating the exact impact of a fixed salary cap is 
left for future studies. On the scope of this study I settle for concluding that the salary cap and 
teams’ average franchise value which is illustrated in Figure 16 are related.  
 
8.2.2 What are the consequences to the NHL players? 
In this chapter, I analyze the consequences of limiting player salaries to the NHL players. The 
most probable outcome is that player salaries are lower on average. My main interest is to find 
out if all player positions experience the same changes in the same way and depth. Also, I 
examine if the relation of positional investments and success has changed due to the 2005 salary 
cap. 
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8.2.2.1 Has the distribution of player salaries leveled after the 2005 salary cap? 
Cumulative salary distribution has leveled since the 2005 salary cap through the whole 
examination period. The most notable change has happened in the salaries of the highest paid 
players (see Appendix 6). This finding supports the findings of Kaijalainen (2013). The Gini 
coefficients of player salaries are presented in Table 4 column 7. Player salaries’ Gini 
coefficients presented decrease during the whole examination period. Supporting Kaijalainen 
(2013) I conclude that the salary distribution between the NHL players has become more even 
after the 2005 salary cap. 
Positional Gini coefficients are presented in Table 10. As we can see from the table below, 
Gini coefficients have decreased in all three player positions.  
Table 5: Positional Gini coefficients of salary 
 Before 2005 After 2005 
All 0.473566 0. 457905 
Defence 0.43742 0.434629 
Offence 0.488113 0.468267 
Goalies 0.47865 0.464238 
The most notable drop is in the Gini coefficient of offensive players as it has dropped almost 
0.02 units. Overall changes are relatively small as 0.02 is the biggest change. Important in this 
finding is that wage equality has decreased rather than increased during the examination period. 
The development of wages in the NHL shows the opposite behavior before the 2005 salary cap. 
Accordingly, the salary cap has balanced the development of salaries among the NHL players 
as wage disparity has not increased after the 2005 salary cap. 
8.2.2.2 Did the 2005 salary cap have an influence on all player positions? 
Figure 17 illustrates the development of accumulated positional salaries in the NHL. Blue line 
is the accumulated seasonal salaries of goalies, the red line is the accumulated seasonal salaries 
of defence, and the black line is the accumulated seasonal salaries of offence. As we can see 
from the figure all player positions experienced a decrease after the 2005 salary cap. 
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Figure 17: Accumulated positional salaries 
 
When considered in absolute numbers, the drop in salaries is the greatest among offence 
players. As there are more offence players than defence players or goalkeepers, I considered it 
reasonable to calculate the drops in percentages. The drop in salaries is the most notable among 
goalkeepers when considering percentage drops. Decrease in accumulated salaries among 
goalkeepers is about 29.8 percent when the corresponding value for defence is approximately 
18.0 percent and for offence it is approximately 22.5 percent. Hence, the influence of the 2005 
salary cap is the most notable for goalkeepers. 
Figure 18 shows the development of three positional average salaries. The positions and colors 
of lines are as in Figure 17. The difference between figures is that Figure 17 illustrates 
accumulated salaries and Figure 18 illustrates average salaries.  
Figure 18: Positional average salaries 
 
Goalkeepers had the highest average salary before the 2005 salary cap. The second highest 
average salary was among offence players and the lowest average salary among defence 
players. There were no changes in this order during the 2001-2004 seasons. As shown in figure 
18 positional average salaries are more balanced after the 2005 salary cap. Accordingly, goalies 
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experience the greatest drop in average salaries, offence players the second greatest and defense 
players the smallest. The drop in goalies’ average salary after the 2005 salary cap was 27.8 
percent. For offence the corresponding percent was 22.7 and for defence it was 16.3 percent. 
The order from the greatest to the smallest has varied after the salary cap as we can see from 
Figure 18.  
Altogether, before the salary cap goalies had the highest average salary fallowed by offence 
and then defence. After the salary cap positional average salaries have been more balanced and 
the order from the greatest to the smallest has varied. 
8.2.2.3 Has the correlations of positional investments and number of playoff rounds changed? 
Figure 19 shows the correlations of investments in different player positions and number of 
playoff rounds of all teams in the NHL. The positions and colors of the lines are as in two 
previous figures. 
Figure 19: Correlation of positional investments and playoff rounds (All teams) 
 
All three correlations seem to have a decreasing trend before the 2005 salary cap. After the 
salary cap, correlation between defence and number of playoff rounds is notably positive. 
Correlation between offence and number of playoff rounds has an increasing trend after the 
salary cap and during the 2013 and 2014 seasons the correlation is more than 0.5. Correlation 
between investments in goalkeepers and number of playoff rounds is varying and having 
negative values during some seasons. Hence, it is hard to find positive relation between 
investments in goalkeepers and number of playoff rounds after the 2005 salary cap. Figure 19 
suggests that after the salary cap, investments in offence have an increasing importance among 
all NHL teams when determining the number of playoff rounds.  
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Figure 20 shows the same relation as does Figure 19. The difference between figures is that 
teams that did not make their way to the playoffs during the season in question are dropped 
from the data set in Figure 20. Hence, Figure 20 makes possible the analysis of the relation of 
positional investments and playoff success. 
Figure 20: Correlation of positional investments and playoff rounds (Playoff teams) 
 
As we can see from Figure 19 and Figure 20, correlations between positional investments and 
number of playoff rounds are lower among playoff teams than among all teams. This supports 
the previous finding that the relation of a payroll and a number of playoff rounds is greater 
among all teams than among playoff teams. Also in Figure 20 correlation of investments in 
offence and the number of playoff rounds has an increasing trend (from about -0.4 to 0.4) after 
the salary cap. Difference in Figure 20 is that correlation is negative shortly after the salary cap 
but as time elapses correlation turns positive and increases. Correlation between investments 
in defence and number of playoff rounds differs yearly and fluctuates between -0.3 and 0.8. 
The average is positive but the trend is decreasing. Consequently, there are not many 
conclusions to be made from this correlation or about its development. Correlation between 
investments in goalkeepers and number of playoff rounds varies around 0 before and after the 
2005 salary cap and no conclusions can be drawn.  
The most important findings in Figures 19 and 20 are that all correlations between positional 
investments and number of playoff rounds were decreasing before the 2005 salary cap. After 
the salary cap correlation between investments in offence and number of playoff rounds has 
been increasing among both, all teams and playoff teams. Trends of other positional 
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
Season
Goalies salary and nr. Of playoff rounds Defence salary and nr. of playoff rounds
Offence salary and nr. Of playoff rounds
 57 
 
correlations have remained stagnant suggesting that the relation of investments in offence and 
success has increased. 
8.2.2.4 Has the correlation of positional payroll shares and number of playoff rounds 
changed? 
Figure 21 shows the correlations of all NHL teams’ positional salary shares and number of 
playoff rounds. Colors and lines are as in previous figures. The difference is that team 
investments are calculated as percentages, not as absolute sums. This figure eliminates the fact 
that some teams’ payrolls are greater than others’.  
Figure 21: Correlation of positional payroll shares and playoffs rounds (All teams) 
 
Figure 21 shows the same increasing trend of investments in offence and number of playoff 
rounds supporting the previous findings. Interestingly the correlation of percent investments in 
defense and number of playoff rounds seem to have decreasing relation in Figure 21. 
Correlation of percent investments in goalkeepers and number of playoff rounds is the same as 
in previous figures, around zero. Figure 21 highlights the increasing positive relation between 
investments in offence and number of playoff rounds after the 2005 salary cap. Also, it suggests 
that investments in defense have a decreasing correlation with playoff rounds after the salary 
cap. 
Figure 22 shows the same correlation as Figure 21 but the non-playoff teams are excluded from 
the data set. 
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Figure 22: Correlation of positional payroll shares and playoffs rounds (Playoff teams) 
 
Trends in Figure 22 have some same features as in Figure 21. Trends are not as steep as in 
Figure 21 and end up closer to the zero level correlation. Again, this supports the finding of a 
payroll being more important during the regular season than in the playoffs. Notable in Figure 
22 is that again the correlation of investments in offence and number of playoff rounds has an 
increasing trend and the correlation of investments in defence and number of playoff rounds 
has a decreasing trend.  
 
8.2.3 Discussion on limited player costs 
Empirical evidence shows that the 2005 NHL salary cap did decrease NHL teams’ player costs. 
Figure 14 shows the decrease in accumulated salaries which is about 22% of total player costs. 
According to previous studies on salary caps, this is an expected result as one of the motivations 
of a salary cap is to limit teams’ costs. Small teams increased spending and large teams 
decreased spending after the NHL salary cap. Consequently, standard deviations between 
teams’ payrolls decreased. The distribution of payrolls is empirically shown to be more 
balanced on the team level (Figure 15). Theory suggests that this should result in a more 
balanced competition in addition to lower costs. 
Economically team owners’ seem to be the biggest winners as shown by the increase in the 
average team franchise value (Figure 16). The average franchise value more than tripled in ten 
years after the 2005 salary cap. The average value remained stagnant before the salary cap and 
started to increase after. Most likely the NHL team owners and investors gain more trust on the 
economic wealth of the teams as a greater share of the income was guaranteed to the teams. 
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More analysis on the topic of why franchise values started to increase is left for future studies. 
In terms of this study I conclude that the NHL team owners have gained significant benefits 
after the introduction of the 2005 salary cap. 
As stated before, player salaries decreased after the salary cap. Supporting Kaijalainen (2013) 
I found that the decrease in salaries was the greatest among the top players. On the other hand, 
players were guaranteed the minimum salary that meant an increase for the lowest paid players. 
All player positions experienced a decrease in accumulated and average salaries. The decrease 
was the most notable for goalkeepers for which the cut was almost one third of their average 
salaries. Before the salary cap goalkeepers enjoyed the highest average salary, offensive 
players the second highest average salary, and defensive players had the lowest average salary. 
The salary cap balanced the salary distribution between the positions. The pay distribution 
familiar before the salary cap ceased to exist after the salary cap as all positions started to 
receive a more equal pay. Empirical analysis suggests that the relation of success and offensive 
salaries has increased after the salary cap. Figures 19-22 show that correlation between 
offensive salaries and success has increased after the salary cap. Correlations of pay and 
success of other two positions remain stagnant or decrease. This might be due to increase in 
the valuation of defensive offensive players. They count as an offensive player due to their 
position but their task is to be also defensive players. Also, offensive players that have 
defensive responsibilities can act as substitutes for defensive investments. Further research on 
this topic is required. In this study I settle for concluding that the relation of pay and team 
performance for offensive players has increased since the 2005 salary cap. 
This study has empirically shown that the 2005 salary cap did decrease teams’ player costs. 
Additionally, the average franchise value of the NHL teams started to increase. Empirically 
presented average franchise value provide support for the argument that the NHL team owners 
are economically the biggest winners after the salary cap. Empirical analysis also shows that 
all three player positions analyzed in this study experienced a decrease in salaries. The increase 
was the greatest among goalkeepers. Offensive players’ relation of pay and success is shown 
to be increasing. This is a possible topic for future studies. In the next chapter, I conclude the 
study and analyze the results with the findings of other studies. 
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9. Conclusions 
Four North American major sports leagues are considered to behave as profit maximizers. One 
possible way for cutting costs and thus increasing profits is to set a salary cap on player salaries. 
This thesis introduces theoretical results of setting a salary cap in professional team sports and 
shows if these results are found in the NHL after the 2005 salary cap. According to previous 
literature (Késenne 2000, Larsen et al. 2006, Dietl et al. 2012) salary caps have two main 
motivations: more balanced competition and lower player costs. 
The 2005 NHL salary cap is a hard salary cap that is calculated as a percentage of revenue of 
league wide sales. It sets upper and lower limits to teams’ player costs. A percentage of revenue 
players’ share gives an incentive for players and owners with joint effort to increase league 
wide revenues. As shown in the empirical part, players’ salaries after the salary cap rapidly 
exceeded the level before the salary cap. Accordingly, league wide revenues increased and 
players’ share grew in terms of dollars. If the NHL aims for competitively more balanced 
league, in theory, it has two ways to reach this in terms of a salary cap. Revenue sharing is not 
included in this study. One option is to lower players’ share and the other is to narrow the gap 
between upper and lower limits of spending giving less leeway for teams’ player budgets. A 
profit maximizing league aims for lower player costs and thus the league prefers lowering the 
players’ share rather than narrowing the salary cap gap. 
If limiting teams’ payroll by a salary cap is expected to balance competition, then player cost 
is expected to be related to success. In the NHL, player cost and team success have a relation 
as shown in the empirical part of the thesis. After the 2005 salary cap, this relation decreased 
for a while but as salaries increased again the relation grew. Correlation of pay and performance 
is positive among all NHL teams but among playoff teams the correlation is close to zero. 
Empirical analysis shows that competitive balance increased during the regular season but did 
not change during playoffs. The results support each other as the relation of player costs and 
success is greater during regular season than playoffs. Accordingly, the balancing effect of the 
salary cap is greater during the regular season than playoffs. 
The 2005 salary cap did reduce player costs in the NHL. The players’ share dropped from about 
76% to 54% due to the salary cap. The average franchise value of NHL teams started to increase 
after the salary cap and after the 2013 CBA the growth accelerated as players’ share was 
dropped to 50%. The average franchise value more than tripled in ten years and accordingly 
the owners have had significant benefits from the setting of the salary cap. 
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Traditionally, goalkeepers are thought to contribute most to the team performance fallowed by 
forwards and then defensemen (Chan, Cho and Novati, 2012). Positional average salaries 
before the salary cap followed this belief; goalies had the highest average salary and 
defensemen the lowest. After the salary cap positional differences in terms of salaries leveled 
and accordingly goalies suffered the greatest loss in terms of salaries by position. Supporting 
Kaijalainen (2013) I find that highest paid players experienced the greatest cut in salaries after 
the 2005 salary cap. Additionally, the lowest paid players experienced an increase in salaries 
due to the minimum per player salary set by the salary cap.  
Research shows that in the case of the NHL there is empirical evidence to support the 
suggestions of theoretical models presented earlier. Firstly, competition is more balanced 
during the regular season. Secondly, player costs decreased when the 2005 salary cap was 
introduced. Success during playoffs is not as significantly related to a payroll as success during 
regular season. Thus, the expected result of more balanced competition is not found during 
playoffs after the salary cap. The challenge for the NHL and the NHLPA is to find an optimal 
level for the salary cap in order to maximize the balancing effect and simultaneously satisfy 
both parties.  
Present player costs have long exceeded the level before the 2005 salary cap. Additionally, 
regular season competition has become more related to a payroll again. Both, decreasing the 
players’ share and narrowing the gap between the upper and lower limits of spending would 
decrease the relation of a payroll and success. As shown by the 2005 salary cap these actions 
resulted in a more competitively balanced regular season competition. 
Both parties, the NHL and the NHLPA, are profit maximizers. Arguably, team owners have 
gained more benefits than players after the salary cap as franchise values have increased and 
player salaries decreased immediately after the salary cap. The two organizations have agreed 
the terms of the 2013 CBA and at soonest new negotiations can be expected at or just before 
2022 when the 2013 CBA comes to its end. If recent trends hold, then we will most probably 
see a decrease in players’ share as league wide sales have increased meaning that player costs 
have increased in terms of dollars. Additionally, a possible outcome is that the payroll gap 
becomes narrower than in the 2013 CBA. This would result in a lower relation of a payroll and 
success as payrolls are forced to be more uniform. The experiences after the 2005 salary cap 
have shown that forcing payrolls to be more convergent results in a more competitively 
balanced regular season competition. 
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My recommendation in order to achieve economic benefits, a competitively balanced league, 
and lower player costs is to start negotiations about the future CBA before the year 2022. 
History shows that the negotiations tend to result in a lockout that can cancel a whole season. 
The NHLPA should highlight the fact that team franchise values have increased rapidly since 
the first salary cap in the NHL to point out the benefits that the owners have gained. The NHL 
should highlight the increase in player salaries after the salary cap to point out the benefits that 
the players have gained. As historically shown, the league usually has the higher ground when 
negotiation new CBAs. To maximize profits new CBA should be formed before the start of the 
2022-2023 season. It remains to be seen if the outcome is a lower players’ share and a narrower 
gap between upper and lower payroll limits. A narrower gap would guarantee a lower relation 
between player costs and success even if the league-wide sales increase. 
Throughout the paper, I assume that the NHL acts as a profit maximizer. This assumption is 
based on previous analysis by Ferguson et al. (1991) with the data from the 1980s NHL ticket 
sales but there is no clear consensus on this topic. In this paper profit maximization is the only 
reasonable assumption and my analysis on the development of the NHL teams’ average 
franchise value supports the assumption. Testing the assumption of profit maximization with 
more recent NHL data is a possible topic for future research. 
In this thesis I have settled for stating that there is a relation between the setting of the salary 
cap and the increase in the average NHL teams’ franchise value. Also, after the 2013 CBA the 
growth in franchise values accelerated, suggesting that there might be one-way causality 
between the two. Further research testing the possible causality between a salary cap and team 
franchise values and on the determinants of team franchise values is needed to make more 
conclusions about the topic. If causality is found, it would support and explain the findings in 
this study that team owners gain economic benefits after the setting of a salary cap. 
I have shown that the relation of offensive players and success has increased since the setting 
of the 2005 salary cap. The thesis does not include any analysis on this phenomenon. I have 
settled for stating that the relation has gown. A possible topic for further research is an analysis 
on why the relation of salaries paid to offensive players in the NHL and success have grown 
after the 2005 salary cap. Possibly the defensive characteristics of traditionally low paid 
offensive players have increased their importance. Ample room for further research on this 
topic. 
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This study is useful for leagues that are considering whether to put a salary cap in operation or 
not. Currently, the Kontinental Hockey League (KHL) is going through economic struggles as 
some teams have left the league due to financial problems and some teams have struggled with 
salary payments. Based on the findings made during my research, I argue that a salary cap 
could help the KHL to overcome its problems. The future of the KHL is unsure and thus the 
teams and the league should recommend a salary cap to be implemented as soon as possible. 
Arguably, the major differences between the KHL and the NHL are that the KHL is facing 
competition by the NHL and so far the KHL has not acted as a profit maximizing league. To 
bolster its future, the KHL should introduce a binding salary cap. Surely, this would mean 
backing down competition with the NHL as the number one league. Some exceptions in a hard 
salary cap could be made to hold on some superstar players meaning that a soft salary cap 
might be a suitable option for the KHL.  However, the KHL provides an interesting arena for 
implementing a salary cap and the economic situations demands it or at least some other 
changes to be made as soon as possible. 
  
 64 
 
References 
 
Articles and books 
Boal, William M., and Michael R. Ransom. "Monopsony in the labor market." Journal of 
Economic Literature (1997): 86-112. 
Chan, Timothy CY, Justin A. Cho, and David C. Novati. "Quantifying the contribution of NHL 
player types to team performance." Interfaces 42, no. 2 (2012): 131-145. 
Dietl, Helmut M., Egon Franck, Markus Lang, and Alexander Rathke. "Salary cap regulation 
in professional team sports." Contemporary economic policy 30, no. 3 (2012): 307-319. 
Dietl, Helmut, Egon Franck, and Stephan Nüesch. "Are Voluntary Salary Cap Agreements 
Self-Enforcing?." European Sport Management Quarterly 6, no. 1 (2006): 23-34. 
Dietl, Helmut M., Martin Grossmann, and Markus Lang. "Competitive balance and revenue 
sharing in sports leagues with utility-maximizing teams." Journal of Sports Economics 12, no. 
3 (2011): 284-308. 
Dietl, Helmut M., Markus Lang, and Alexander Rathke. "The effect of salary caps in 
professional team sports on social welfare." The BE journal of economic analysis & policy 9, 
no. 1 (2009). 
Ferguson, Donald G., Kenneth G. Stewart, J. C. H. Jones, and Andre Le Dressay. "The pricing 
of sports events: do teams maximize profit?." The Journal of Industrial Economics (1991): 297-
310. 
Fort, Rodney, and James Quirk. "Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional 
team sports leagues." Journal of Economic Literature (1995): 1265-1299. 
Hall, Stephen, Stefan Szymanski, and Andrew S. Zimbalist. "Testing causality between team 
performance and payroll the cases of major league baseball and english soccer." Journal of 
Sports Economics 3, no. 2 (2002): 149-168. 
Kahn, Lawrence M. "The sports business as a labor market laboratory." The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (2000): 75-94. 
 65 
 
Kaijalainen, Katariina. "the Effect of the Changes in the 2005 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement on the Labor Markets of NHL Players" Aalto University School of Business, 
Department of Economics. Master’s Thesis (2013) 
Késenne, Stefan. “Player market regulation and competitive balance in a win maximizing 
scenario.” In C. Jeanrenaud & S. Késenne (Eds), Competition policy in professional sports, 
Europe after the Bosman case (pp. 117-131). Antwerp, Belgium: CIES Standard Editions, 
1999. 
Késenne, Stefan. "The impact of salary caps in professional team sports." Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy 47, no. 4 (2000): 422-430. 
Larsen, Andrew, Aju J. Fenn, and Erin Leanne Spenner. "The impact of free agency and the 
salary cap on competitive balance in the National Football League." Journal of Sports 
Economics 7, no. 4 (2006): 374-390. 
Neal, Walter C. "The peculiar economics of professional sports." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 78, no. 1 (1964): 1-14. 
Pedersen, Paul M., and Lucie Thibault, eds. Contemporary Sport Management, 5E. Human 
Kinetics, 2014. 
Riess, Steven A. Sport in industrial America, 1850-1920. John Wiley & Sons, 2012. 
Rosen, Sherwin, and Allen Sanderson. "Labour markets in professional sports." The Economic 
Journal 111, no. 469 (2001): 47-68. 
Rosenthal, Jeffrey A. "Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the End, The." Marq. Sports 
LJ 6 (1995): 1. 
Rottenberg, Simon. "The baseball players' labor market." The Journal of Political Economy 
(1956): 242-258. 
Staudohar, Paul D. "Hockey Lockout of 2004-05, The." Monthly Lab. Rev. 128 (2005): 23. 
Staudohar, Paul D. "Salary caps in professional team sports." Compensation and working 
conditions 3 (1998): 3-11. 
Vrooman, John. "The economics of American sports leagues." Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 47, no. 4 (2000): 364-398. 
 66 
 
Zimbalist, Andrew. "Reflections on salary shares and salary caps." Journal of Sports 
Economics 11, no. 1 (2010): 17-28. 
 
Internet 
Forbes – NHL team values http://www.forbes.com/nhl-valuations/list/ Visited 27.3.2015 
Hockey reference – After regular season rankings and points http://www.hockey-
reference.com/leagues/ Visited 8.4.2015, 22.4.2015 and 23.4.2015 
Hockey reference – Stanley Cup playoffs http://www.hockey-reference.com/playoffs/ Visited 
20.3.2015 
Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement: 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/2012MLB_MLBPA_CBA.
pdf Visited 6.3.2015 
National Basketball Collective Bargaining Agreement: 
http://www.nba.com/media/CBA101.pdf Visited 5.3.2015  
National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement: 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf 
Visited 5.3.2015 
National Hockey League Collective Bargaining Agreement announcement: 
http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement Visited 25.2.2015 
National Hockey League Collective Bargaining Agreement: 
http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf Visited 25.2.2015 
NHL History timeline http://www.nhl.com/history/timeline.html Visited 17.3.2015 
NHL season 2014-2015 salary cap: http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=724192 Visited 
25.2.2015 
NHL statistics: www.nhlnubers.com Visited 5.3.2015 
Pro Ice Hockey 1 http://proicehockey.about.com/od/history/a/Nhl-Lockouts-And-Strikes-A-
History.htm Visited 17.3.2015 
 67 
 
Pro Ice Hockey 2 – NHL lockout in 2012? 
http://proicehockey.about.com/od/nhlnewsscoresstats/a/Nhl-Lockout-In-2012-A-Look-At-
The-Issues.htm Visited 17.3.2015 
Salary cap definition: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/salary-cap.html Visited 
19.1.2015 
THE PUCK REPORT – History of NHL Expansion http://www.puckreport.com/2009/05/nhl-
expansion.html Visited 17.3.2015 
USA Today – NHL Salaries http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nhl/salaries/ Visited 16.3.2015 
 
  
 68 
 
Appendixes 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
p
o
in
ts
Cumulative share of teams
Equality Before 2005
After 2005 (06-09) After 2005 (10-14)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 20 40 60 80 100C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
st
an
d
in
gs
 a
ft
er
 
re
gu
la
r 
se
as
o
n
Cumulative share of teams
Equality Before 2005 After 2005 (06-09) After (10-14)
 69 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 4 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 20 40 60 80 100C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
p
la
yo
ff
 r
o
u
n
d
s
Cumulative share of all teams
Equality Before After (06-09) After (10-14)
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
p
la
yo
ff
 r
o
u
n
d
s
Cumulative share of playoff teams
Equality Before After (06-09) After (10-14)
 70 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Appendix 7 
Time period Gini coefficient 
Before the 2005 salary cap 0.484357872 
After the 2005 salary cap (06-09) 0.504353234 
After the 2005 salary cap (10-13) 0.462857143 
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